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Destabilizing Property 
EZRA ROSSER 
Property theory has entered into uncertain times. Conservative and 
progressive scholars are, it seems, fiercely contesting everything, from 
what is at the core of property to what obligations owners owe society.  
Fundamentally, the debate is about whether property law works. 
Conservatives believe that property law works. Progressives believe 
property law could and should work, though it needs to be made more 
inclusive. While there have been numerous responses to the conservative 
emphasis on exclusion, this Article begins by addressing a related line of 
argument, the recent attacks information theorists have made on the 
bundle of rights conception of property. This Article goes on to make two 
main contributions to the literature: it gives a new critique of progressive 
property and, more fundamentally, shows how distribution challenges in 
property call for a third path forward. Conservative scholarship is 
scholarship for property, defending traditional views of property against 
the influence of new realist-inspired deconstruction. Progressive 
scholarship works with property, showing how doctrine supports 
expanding property law to reach those who would otherwise be excluded.  
But missing from this debate is the possibility that, instead of working for 
or with property, the rise in inequality and the calcification of advantages 
defined at birth of the current economic and legal environment calls for 
work against property. Expanding the range of answers to the broad 
questions being asked of property to include deliberately destabilizing 
property would add to the academic debate and to the possible policy 
responses to the emerging threat of oligarchy. Working for, with, and 
against property are all answers to the question of how to respond to the 
property crisis of our time, the problem of inequality. This Article seeks to 
give some content to the neglected against portion of the spectrum. 
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Destabilizing Property 
EZRA ROSSER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Property theory has entered into uncertain times. Conservative and 
progressive scholars are, it seems, fiercely contesting everything, from 
what is at the core of property to what obligations owners owe society. 
This contest is not a matter of happenstance, of decontextualized scholarly 
pontification. Instead, the scholarly debates mirror similar upheavals in the 
role property plays in the lives of many Americans. The Great Recession is 
but a stark reminder that the American Dream is fragile. Working-class 
families have not seen significant welfare improvements in over a 
generation, even as the wealthy have consolidated their economic 
advantages. The New Gilded Age is defined largely by rising inequality, 
but it should not be surprising that property law scholarship has become 
more contentious and has taken on bigger questions as the clouds 
surrounding property’s role in society darken. There is a place for purely 
theoretical scholarship, but a field that does not engage in the questions of 
the day would be neglecting an important aspect of the academic exercise. 
When it comes to property, the questions of the day revolve around 
inequality, and this is reflected in the broad nature of the questions scholars 
are asking of property law. But, while the questions are broad, the answers 
are too narrow.   
The back-and-forth between conservatives and progressives formally 
centers on whether property law is best understood in terms of clear-cut 
rules or messy, multi-layered standards and exceptions. But, more 
fundamentally, the debate is about whether property law works. 
Conservative information cost theorists believe that property law works. 
Progressives believe property law could and should work, though it needs 
to be made more inclusive. Scholarship from both camps is shaped 
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accordingly. Conservative scholarship is scholarship for property, 
defending traditional views of property against the influence of realist-
inspired deconstruction. Conservative scholars argue that their models 
better describe property law and draw upon that descriptive accuracy to 
ground normative claims that celebrate the status quo through declarations 
that the current rules are efficient, good rules.1 Progressive scholarship 
works with property, showing how doctrine supports expanding property 
law to reach those who would otherwise be excluded, and highlighting 
areas in which social values have created exceptions that deviate from an 
exclusion-centric understanding of property law. Put differently, while 
conservative scholars gaze upon the edifice of property law and applaud it, 
progressive scholars seek improvements to the law rather than 
retrenchment.2 But missing from this debate is the possibility that, instead 
of working for or with property, the rise of inequality and the calcification 
of advantages defined at birth of the current economic and legal 
environment calls for work against property. Working against private, 
exclusion-based property can take many forms, including selectively 
leveraging doctrine in support of broad market access and in defense of 
poor communities. Where the doctrine proves inadequate, confrontation 
and resistance to the oppressive features of the law may be required. 
Expanding the range of answers to the broad questions being asked of 
property to include deliberately destabilizing property would add to the 
academic debate and to the range of possible policy responses to the 
emerging threat of oligarchy.  
The idea of destabilizing property is not inherently radical. The 
relationship between property law and the capitalist market that is taken for 
granted today itself contains features that were seen as radical when they 
were first introduced. Feudalism gave way to capitalism, in part, because 
use rights and alienation of land went from things that were sharply 
limited, to matters of individual freedom that were expected “sticks” in the 
bundle of rights.3 Similarly, the economic system built around slave labor 
was undone, in part, because of a rejection, first by activists and later by 
politicians, of the idea that Southerners could own humans as property. 
Destabilizing property is only radical from a vantage point that privileges 
                                                                                                                          
1 See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1692 (2012) 
(arguing that “traditional baselines . . . are very worthy of explanation and a good deal of respect”). But 
see Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1560 (2003) (arguing that “[t]o 
avoid the pitfalls of essentializing the existing repertoire of property forms, however, we must avoid 
according these forms overwhelming normative authority”).   
2 See Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 923 (2010) 
(arguing that progressive scholars are “far more open to quick interventions to improve the system”).   
3 See Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 456–57 (2014) (explaining that 
feudal property was replaced by “allodial” property, or property that is free of any obligation of fealty 
to a lord or superior).  
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existing institutions and understandings of property. But if that is the 
vantage point, then, yes, there is something radical about the argument that 
the extent to which the property of the wealthy is protected ought to 
depend upon the availability of similar benefits to the rest of the 
population. Much less radical is the observation that property law occupies 
a troubling space in the ongoing crisis of capitalism and the distribution of 
property. If property law is built, in part, upon the premise that its benefits 
either are widely shared or are available to all who strive for them, the 
problems plaguing the current economic structure—inequitable 
opportunities, wage and wealth stagnation or decline, persistent multi-
generational poverty, and lack of economic mobility—raise the possibility 
that property law serves a sliver of the population well, but does not serve 
society well. Working for, with, and against property are all answers to the 
question of how to respond to the property crisis of our time: the problem 
of inequality. This Article seeks to give some content to the neglected 
against portion of the spectrum.    
As is true of American politics generally, the conservative-progressive 
binary in property theory does a disservice to the legitimacy of the points 
being made by all sides and serves to truncate the range of alternatives that 
are considered. Although this Article takes a more skeptical view on what 
property law can and cannot accomplish in its current form, it also builds 
upon the foundation laid by both conservative and progressive scholars. 
For many good reasons, economic analysis plays a significant role in 
property scholarship,4 and the same can be said for efforts to show that 
property law can, and has, accommodated societal values that are not and 
should not be reducible to economic values.5 More importantly, scholars 
who are generally concerned about the same thing—how property law can 
best serve society today—can reach very different conclusions. Though 
there is disagreement about whether the focus should be on ends or means,6 
progressives and conservatives alike care that property rules serve valuable 
functions in society, including the pursuit of distributive justice.7 Stated 
differently, progressives do not have a monopoly on thinking that property 
should serve human values.8 Although progressive scholars have taken on 
                                                                                                                          
4 See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, The Law and Economics Approach to Property, 3 PROP. L. REV. 212 
(2014).   
5 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 743, 743–44 (2009).   
6 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 1718–20.   
7 Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An Essay for Tom Merrill, 3 
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 65 (2014); see also Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of 
Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 300 (1998) (observing that proponents of strong property rights and 
those who argue that property rights reflect human values both believe their version of property 
“structure[s] social relations in the best way possible”). 
8 See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human values.”). 
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the mantle of a socially minded understanding of property,9 the idea that 
property law should be a certain way because it is best for society also lies 
at the heart of efficiency-based arguments. But the property distribution 
crisis of the New Gilded Age and the related academic questions 
surrounding the nature of property are at risk of only being partially 
addressed. Both the conservative bias in favor of the status quo and the 
progressive view that the tools necessary can be found in existing doctrine 
are inward looking and as such are unlikely to greatly upset settled notions. 
The conservative view is nostalgic and divorced from the challenges 
development and inequality create for property.10 The progressive view, in 
contrast, is optimistic about the possibility of property law being 
transformed from within and believes in incorporating social values into an 
institution designed to resist change.11 But conservative and progressive 
views alike prioritize the extent to which their solutions or responses map 
onto established doctrine, and though their conclusions differ, the goal is 
the same: strengthening property law.12 As a result, only those alternatives 
that do not break too far from past practices or that build upon past 
practices are considered. Missing is the possibility that past understandings 
of property law—especially as they provide security for some while 
denying it for many others—may be inadequate for the current task. The 
way that property operates today requires that we “consider the possibility 
of fundamental challenges to the very foundations of the existing property 
regime.”13 Across political lines there is growing awareness that society is 
being adversely impacted by the rise in inequality and the related forty-
year stagnation in the well-being of most working Americans.14 Property 
law is a crucial site of conflict about how to respond and, as comforting as 
it is to either cling to (a negative take on the conservative position) or rely 
upon (a negative take on the progressive position) existing rules, 
responding to the challenge presented by the emerging oligarchy may 
                                                                                                                          
9 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009).   
10 See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, City Replanning 61 (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477125. 
11 Baron, supra note 2, at 957–62. 
12 See Derek Fincham, The Distinctiveness of Property and Heritage, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 641, 
644 (2013) (noting the “strong descriptive component” of perspectives on property).   
13 A J VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS 14 (2009).   
14 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY 
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 3 (2012) (“Members of America’s middle class have felt that they were 
long-suffering, and they were right. For three decades before the crisis, their incomes had barely 
budged. Indeed, the income of a typical full-time male worker has stagnated for well over a third of a 
century.”); STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS., HOW INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY IS 
DAMPENING U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND POSSIBLE WAYS TO CHANGE THE TIDE 3 (2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/forum/Forum_2014/Income_Inequality.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
922V-X2ZH] (“[I]nequality in the U.S. is dampening GDP growth . . . .”).   
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require weakening, not strengthening, property law.15  
Property protections can be weakened in different ways, but, broadly 
speaking, destabilization involves either selective use of existing law or, 
where existing law does not provide sufficient leverage, pragmatic 
resistance to exclusionary elements of property law. As a mechanism to 
undermine false stratifications, structural inequality, and exclusion, 
destabilization can be used as a lever to promote more sustainable and 
inclusive forms of property law and economic growth. Destabilization can 
be meaningful in and of itself; in other words, in some circumstances, 
weakening the expectations of property owners is the end goal. For 
example, when black college students protested segregated lunch counters 
by staging a sit-in at the Greensboro, North Carolina Woolworth’s, their 
goal was to force the store to become more inclusive, despite there being 
settled property expectations that owners had the right to exclude on the 
basis of race.16 But destabilization can also find its meaning through 
politics, lessening or threatening to lessen property protections because of 
the instrumental value in doing so. When workers engage in sit-down 
strikes, the property rights of factory owners are diminished relative to a 
default, exclusion-based understanding of those rights.17 The goal of the 
union usually is not to occupy the factory, but instead is to improve 
working conditions, especially worker pay. This lesson can be applied 
more broadly in that there can be political value in undermining or 
threatening to undermine the property rights of owners, even if the goal is 
not necessarily to take away those rights or to redistribute property. 
Weakening property protections—even where there is recognized value in 
exclusionary rights—can make it difficult on a personal and political level 
for those who benefit from the property system to be indifferent to the 
needs of those excluded from such benefits.     
For those who rely on property or hope to join the propertied class, the 
                                                                                                                          
15 Put differently, it may require taking cues from housing activists and “challenging local 
property entitlements.” Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying the Constitutional Right to Housing 21 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2497695.  
For more on the emerging oligarchy in a rare example of an academic study that “went viral,” see 
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and 
Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576–77 (2014) (concluding that American democracy is 
threatened because a small number of affluent Americans dominate policymaking, even when the 
majority of citizens disagree with them); see also John Cassidy, Is America an Oligarchy?, NEW 
YORKER (Apr. 18, 2014) http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/is-america-an-oligarchy 
[http://perma.cc/8A7C-PQZM] (discussing the Gilens and Page study); Lucille A. Jewel, Merit and 
Mobility: A Progressive View of Class, Culture, and the Law, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 239, 244 (2012) 
(discussing the possibility “that the structure of American society is trending toward oligarchy”).      
16 EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, 
PIRATES, AND PROTESTORS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 1–3 (2010). 
17 See Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and the Shaping of American Industrial 
Relations, 1935–1958, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 45 (2006) (giving a history of sit-down strikes). 
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notion that property can function largely as a protector of the status quo is 
troublesome. But for those excluded, often at birth, from sharing in most of 
the benefits of the strong expectation that property will, and should, be 
protected, destabilizing property is much less threatening. By leveraging 
points of conflict or tension already built into institutions that protect 
private property, communities can undermine structures that reinforce false 
stratifications. Even where there are advantages to the current rules, by 
credibly threatening to unsettle expectations and the status quo, excluded 
communities or individuals increase their ability to claim compensating 
payments for the harms associated with those rules. The point of 
destabilizing property is not, in every instance, to replace the structure or 
the rules, but to advance the interests of the excluded by questioning the 
existing rules and changing or threatening to change them where their 
benefits are inequitably shared. While it may be impossible to reconcile the 
positions of those with property and those without, where the law serves to 
limit the enjoyment of property to the fortunate few at the expense of the 
excluded, it should be subject to an ongoing effort to find better 
institutional arrangements. 
This Article begins, in Part II, by exploring information cost 
explanations of property rules. Over a long series of articles, Professors 
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have advanced an understanding of 
property law that emphasizes information cost advantages to owners and to 
the public of the exclusionary rule.18 An equally extensive literature has 
developed that critiques their theory as a truncated version of property law 
that fails to take into account all of the limitations on the right to exclude 
and that overlooks non-economic rationales behind different doctrines.19 
Because there is such a well-developed literature responding to the 
information cost model, Part II concentrates on elements of Merrill and 
Smith’s model that have received less attention; namely, their attack on the 
bundle of rights conception of property rights and what I argue is their 
status quo bias. Information cost theory should not be understood as 
synonymous either with conservative or with law and economics 
scholarship. Conservative property scholarship is not always grounded in 
law and economics.20 Similarly, while there are conservative law and 
economics scholars, there are also scholars who employ law and 
                                                                                                                          
18 The choice to focus on Merrill and Smith is not random. See John A. Lovett, Progressive 
Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 746 (2010) (“Thomas 
Merrill and Henry Smith’s versions of this exclusion oriented view of property are the most vital and 
influential.”).   
19 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 222 (8th ed. 2014) (collecting several sources and 
summarizing their various critiques of the view held by Merrill and Smith).   
20 See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and 
Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379 (2010).    
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economics approaches in support of progressive goals.21 Part II focuses on 
information cost theory because it is perhaps the most important branch of 
conservative law and economics property theory today and is a great 
example of scholarship that works for property. 
Part III explores the ways that progressive scholars seek to improve 
property law by extending property protections to vulnerable or excluded 
people. One of the most important contributions of progressive property 
scholars has been to show that people may gain property rights through 
extended use even where they lack formal rights. Part III explores these 
contributions and the related tendency among progressives to work with, 
rather than against, property. It draws upon Charles Reich’s The New 
Property22 and Joseph Singer’s The Reliance Interest in Property23 because 
of the importance of these articles in progressive theory. The progressive 
inclination to work with property is then illustrated by exploring David 
Super’s use of property concepts to respond to the rise in economic 
inequality in his article, A New New Property.24  
The underlying question of how property law scholars have or should 
respond to a class society in which many people have little to no access to 
property is addressed in Part IV. Although it risks sounding hyperbolic, 
these are, or should be, trying times for the country’s economic system and 
for its support mechanisms, including property law. Inequality measures 
and poverty rates are at or near historic highs;25 the American Dream 
seems quite remote for a whole generation who are graduating into the 
Great Recession, facing un- and under-employment; and there is growing 
awareness of the country’s relative lack of economic mobility.26 
Progressives and conservatives alike are recognizing the way that the 
ladder between classes seems to be broken and the place of individuals is 
predictively defined not by merit or effort, but by the lottery of birth.27  
Property scholars concerned about the growing gap between what 
property law looks like in theory and how it operates in practice in light of 
poverty and inequality tend to gravitate towards one of two paths. The first 
                                                                                                                          
21 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227 (2006).   
22 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
23 Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988). 
24 David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773 (2013). 
25 See infra notes 406–12 and accompanying text. 
26 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 265 (“America is no longer the land of opportunity.”); 
Priya S. Gupta, The American Dream, Deferred: Contextualing Property After the Foreclosure Crisis, 
73 MD. L. REV. 523, 523 (2014) (“In a few short years, the American Dream has dried up like a raisin 
in the sun.”); Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Why Housing?, 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 5, 21 
(2013) (“Our current upheaval is so great that contemporary accounts refer to it as the end of the 
American Dream.”). 
27 See Jason DeParle, Harder for Americans to Rise from Lower Rungs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/harder-for-americans-to-rise-from-lower-rungs.html 
(reporting on bipartisan concern about America’s relatively low level of economic mobility).    
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path is to focus on doctrine. From this perspective, the scholarly role is to 
show the myriad ways that property law already provides mechanisms for 
a better, more inclusive society. Doctrine provides the moorings, but 
property doctrine is sufficiently elastic and comes in enough forms that one 
can build a hopeful vision.28 That these doctrine-based possibilities might 
be mere ripples in the larger ocean of law that protects the status quo is 
glossed over. The doctrinal perspective defines property narrowly—as a 
discrete field of study and not something that should be understood as 
highly contextual—and can only shrug, disclaiming responsibility, when 
alternatives that might have provided the foundation for a more inclusive 
society are neglected.  
The second path is to double-down on property. According to this 
perspective, the problem is not too much but too little property. Unlike the 
doctrinal path, here, property and property law are understood expansively. 
Whole areas of law and human experience can be understood in terms of 
property law and the path forward is to ensure the benefits of property are 
shared by the poor and the formerly excluded. An inclusive version of 
property law from this perspective serves as a form of salvation, expanding 
what counts as property and how people can claim a property interest, all 
the while reaffirming the edifice of property law. By doubling-down on 
property, scholars from Charles Reich forward have embraced property 
even as they emphasize the need to share the benefits of property more 
widely.29 The problem with doubling down is that it requires a perhaps 
unwarranted optimism or faith that those seeking a more inclusive version 
of property law will end up with the best hand and not those who seek a 
continuation of the status quo.   
A third path, albeit one largely ignored, is for those concerned about 
the relationship between property law and the linked problems of 
inequality and poverty to seek to undermine, not support, property. 
According to this perspective, there is a need for an alternative to the two 
dominant reactionary modes, both of which buy into the potential of 
property. The call for creative use of existing doctrine and the call for the 
needs of the poor to be covered in property’s protective blanket both move 
in the right direction, but they are unlikely to result in meaningful change 
unless they are coupled with credible threats to the status quo. Moving 
from what is to what is possible requires an appreciation of the challenges 
associated with the New Gilded Age. Existing institutions, including forms 
of distributing and protecting property, must be continually questioned. In 
                                                                                                                          
28 For one version of such a hopeful vision, see JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: 
FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (2010).    
29 See Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 39 (1990) (explaining an inclusionary approach to property that would 
provide each person with a right to shelter and sustenance). 
 2015] DESTABILIZING PROPERTY 407 
order to enable positive change, the tremendous security enjoyed by those 
who benefit disproportionately from the existing exclusionary rules and 
property rights regime must be diminished or threatened. The problems of 
inequality and poverty, especially as they relate to the acquisition and 
distribution of property, demand that we explore a third path, one that 
adopts a critical and skeptical stance towards property protections.   
II.  THE INFORMATION COST REFRAIN 
A standard starting point for progressive writing on property law over 
the last decade has become an overview of and attack on information cost 
theory. Indeed, that this is so common among progressives raises the 
question of whether such critiques are based on the strengths of 
information cost theory or because the theory is such a convenient foil. In a 
series of path-breaking articles, Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry 
Smith argued that the advantages of property law are best understood in 
terms of enforced simplicity.30 In particular, the centrality of the 
exclusionary rule and limits on the forms property can take generate 
tremendous information cost advantages to society, primarily because they 
simplify information demands upon third parties.31 Unlike contract law 
where parties can negotiate individualized sets of rights and obligations, 
property law limits the acceptable types of property in ways that are readily 
understood by third parties. Moreover, the exclusionary rule, which Merrill 
and Smith argue lies at, or near,32 the heart of property law, makes it 
relatively easy to enforce and understand property rights while providing 
owners latitude to use their property effectively. The information cost 
theory acts as a lightning rod for progressive responses.33 It is attacked for 
giving an overly economic explanation to property law and for ignoring 
                                                                                                                          
30 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1849, 1850–51 (2007) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, The Morality of Property] (suggesting that 
property rights are rooted in simple morality); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The 
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 776 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, The 
Property/Contract Interface] (describing property law as a fixed system of mutually accepted rules); 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus 
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization] 
(explaining that property law is a relatively limited field, constrained by strict standardizations); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 733 (1998) [hereinafter 
Merrill, Right to Exclude] (explaining that property law contains particular rights that are dependent 
upon an institutional authority to create and enforce them).   
31 For a good summary of information-cost theory, see Jerediah Purdy, Some Pluralism About 
Pluralism: A Comment on Hanoch Dagan’s “Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law,” 113 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 9, 11–15 (2013), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/02/9_Purdy.pdf [http://perma.cc/JCA4-X3TP]. 
32 See Henry E. Smith, The Thing about Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 95, 
96 (2014) (asserting that the right to exclude is central, if not the linchpin, in property law).   
33 See, e.g., id. at 95.  
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exceptions that undermine the claimed simplicity of the system.34 These 
responses have not stopped Merrill and Smith, both prolific scholars, from 
repeating the main idea of their theory in article after article, for over a 
decade and a half in somewhat of a refrain.35 
An extensive literature explores information cost theory’s strengths 
and weaknesses. Merrill and Smith’s insightful work on the numerus 
clausus principle captured an important and under-appreciated aspect of 
property law; namely, that in contrast with contract law, property comes in 
a standard and closed set of forms. Their work helped establish that the 
numerus clausus principle applies under the common law as a matter of 
practice just as it exists explicitly in the civil law.36 For scholars who have 
internalized Hohfeld’s bundle of rights concept,37 the idea that property 
law only allows some bundle forms and not others is eye-opening. 
Similarly, Merrill and Smith, separately and as co-authors, showed the 
importance, and for them the singular importance, of the right to exclude.38 
In their treatment of the exclusionary rule, Merrill and Smith make a fairly 
strong case that not all sticks are created equally—some rights lie more at 
the core of what is property than other rights. Exclusion operates as a 
widely understood bright line rule that is so important that Merrill and 
Smith equate it with “classic property rights.”39 The connection between 
their numerus clausus and exclusionary rule work can be found in the 
information cost explanation they give for the bounded and simple nature 
of property rules. And it is in their explanation, arguably, that they move 
from description to theory.     
Merrill and Smith argue that property law is simple—it has a limited 
number of allowable forms and is based on the easily understood 
exclusionary rule—because simplicity minimizes the information costs to 
                                                                                                                          
34 See Meredith M. Render, Complexity in Property, 81 TENN. L. REV. 79, 98–118 (2013) 
(presenting a catalogue of many of these critiques).    
35 Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1063 (2009).   
36 Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 30. 
37 For the articles in which Hohfeld developed the concept, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) 
[hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 1917]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); see also 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 544–46 
(2005) (giving a quick intellectual history of the bundle concept); Henry E. Smith, Property Is Not Just 
a Bundle of Rights, 8 ECON J. WATCH 279, 279–81 (2011), http://econjwatch.org/articles/property-is-
not-just-a-bundle-of-rights [http://perma.cc/8S46-SKD9] (same). 
38 See, e.g., Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 30, at 730 (“[T]he right to exclude others is 
more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”); see also 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics, 111 YALE 
L.J. 357, 360 (2001) (explaining that property rights have historically been in rem because of our right 
to exclude); Smith, supra note 37, at 281 (describing the right to exclude as “how property works” 
(emphasis in original)). 
39 Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, supra note 30, at 792. 
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third parties. Contract law is concerned with the rights between two 
parties, which means that through contract, parties can create rights and 
obligations that are both complex and nuanced. In contrast, the in rem 
nature of property law—the fact that property law defines rights a person 
has against the whole world—means that property law needs to economize 
on concepts and complexity. By their very nature, many items of property 
are distinct: one plot of land may be different from other plots of land in 
terms of everything from its physical dimensions and existing uses to the 
minerals found under the surface and its location relative to services.40 But 
if every item or plot of land was subject to individually distinct legal 
characteristics as well, the information costs borne by third parties and 
society could be tremendous. Complexity, Merrill and Smith argue, would 
frustrate the exchange of property and the functioning of markets. In small 
societies—Merrill and Smith use the example of Robinson Crusoe—rights 
can be kept in personam; but in larger societies, contract rights are 
unwieldy and in rem property rights are required.41 By reducing the set of 
allowable forms for holding property (numerus clausus) and by using a 
simple boundary rule to establish the rights between owners and non-
owners (exclusion), property law reduces information costs. 
While I have provided only a thumbnail sketch of information cost 
theory, the centrality of efficiency-based reasoning to Merrill and Smith’s 
understanding of property comes across even in this quick overview. 
Whether looking at real property or intellectual property, Merrill and Smith 
use their information cost theory to explain why some rights are protected 
by a bounded set of simple exclusionary rules and others by more complex 
and more information-dependent governance rules.42 Although they should 
not be faulted for their conviction and belief in their own thesis, 
information cost theory claims to be more than just another way of looking 
at property law but as the way it should be understood. The idea that there 
are information cost advantages to simple rules is undoubtedly true and by 
itself not that controversial. Merrill and Smith’s repeated insistence that 
property law should be guided by this single efficiency-based goal, 
however, invites critique. 
Most of the criticism of information cost theory centers on the fact that 
property law does more than just enhance efficiency. Non-economic value 
                                                                                                                          
40 See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 828–29 (2009) (discussing 
the complexity of different parcels of land and how each property is unique because of this).   
41 Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, supra note 30, at 793 (“The unique 
advantage of in rem rights—the strategy of exclusion—is that they conserve on information costs 
relative to in personam rights in situations where the number of potential claimants to resources is 
large, and the resource in question can be defined at relatively low cost.”). 
42 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two 
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).      
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judgments also shape property law rules. As multiple scholars 
convincingly show, politics cannot be excised from our understanding of 
property law simply because aspects of the existing system are arguably 
efficient.43 The form and content of rules reflect political choices and 
property law cannot avoid politics simply by resorting to an efficiency 
approach, for that too is a choice. Understanding property rules as being 
based on societal choices rather than deriving somehow, in an inevitable 
fashion, from economic theory creates space for critical scholarship with 
alternative normative perspectives. Into this space, progressive property 
scholars Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, and Joseph Singer, for 
example, advocate, respectively, for property law to be grounded on social 
obligations, value ethics, and democracy-enhancing concerns.44 A broader 
strain of reactionary scholarship takes aim at law and economics 
approaches in property law in general, with the information cost theory 
simply being the most prominent of the targets.45 
A related critique of information cost theory is that it offers a falsely 
simplified vision of property law. Merrill and Smith’s theory depends on 
property rules being standardized and easily understood because the 
information cost advantages disappear if they are not. If property law is 
complicated, to make sense of property rights third parties have to know 
too much and property rights cannot be easily protected or transferred. 
Merrill and Smith deal with this challenge by focusing on the rules alone, 
ignoring or treating dismissively exceptions to the rules that undermine the 
simplicity of the system.46 Critics of information cost theory run in the 
opposite direction, arguing that rules and their exceptions cannot be 
cleanly separated—that to understand the rules, you have to know and 
understand the exceptions.47 Additionally, given that information cost 
theory is in part based on the idea that exclusion lies at the heart of what it 
means for something to be property (or at least that it is very important), 
responses, not surprisingly, tend to be skeptical about the singular 
importance of exclusion.48 By showing the complex nature of property 
                                                                                                                          
43 See, e.g., Dagan, The Craft of Property, supra note 1, at 1558–65; Nestor M. Davidson, 
Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008); Avihay Dorfman, 
Private Ownership and the Standing to Say So, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 402 (2014). 
44 Alexander, supra note 9; Peñalver, supra note 40; Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: 
Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009); see also Ezra 
Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107 
(2013) (presenting an overview of progressive property arguments).     
45 See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847 (2013); Eric T. 
Freyfogle, Private Land Made (Too) Simple, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10155 (2003); Peñalver, supra note 40.     
46 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 44, at 1025–26 (arguing that our current estates system is one 
example of Merrill and Smith oversimplifying property rights). 
47 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1369, 1428–29 (2013); Singer, supra note 44, at 1026–27. 
48 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 35, at 1064. 
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even in light of the numerus clausus principle and the exclusionary rule—
consider, for example, the multiple overlapping property rights that parties 
can have in a single parcel by dividing the property into use rights such as 
easements and equitable servitudes or into time segments such as life 
estates and reversionary interests—critics challenge Merrill and Smith’s 
reductionist presentation of property law.49 
Moving away from the core elements of information cost theory and 
the vast literature it has spawned in response, I turn now to Merrill and 
Smith’s more recent works. Although somewhat at the periphery of 
information cost theory, the recent attacks by Merrill and Smith on the 
bundle of rights conception of property and on legal realism flow naturally 
from the larger argument and indeed can be found throughout their 
scholarship.50 In place of the bundle of sticks, Smith offers up an 
alternative modular theory of property.51 For his part, Merrill first suggests 
property is similar to a prism,52 and then argues for a narrow understanding 
of what he calls the property strategy.53 I believe the works of both 
scholars shed light on the malleability of property institutions, but also 
overstate the danger that the bundle of rights poses to traditional property 
rights. More importantly for my purposes, a defensive bias in favor of the 
status quo can be seen in their efforts to depose the legal realist bundle-of-
sticks conception of property and replace it with less dynamic, more fixed 
versions of property. 
                                                                                                                          
49 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, Property, Contract and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S374 (2002); see 
also Dagan, supra note 1, at 1565–70 (examining Hansmann and Kraakman’s critique of Merrill and 
Smith); Davidson, supra note 43, at 1599–600 (seeking to add “structure and content” to the 
standardization of numerus clausus); Render, supra note 34, at 108–10 (observing the two main 
challenges to Merrill and Smith’s claim that information costs are not actually reduced with numerus 
clausus, and that it does not restrict the enforcement of property interests); Anna di Robilant, Property 
and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus Principle and Democratic Experimentalism in 
Property Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 394–402 (2014) (examining Merrill and Smith’s reductionist 
approach in a larger discussion on numerus clausus and “deliberative democracy”). 
50 Though I focus on their most recent attacks in this Article, Merrill and Smith have been 
attacking the bundle for some time. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean 
Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77, S77–78 (2011) (“In his seminal writings, Coase 
assumes a picture of property as ad hoc bundles of government-prescribed use rights. This assumption 
is deeply misleading in critical respects and is out of sync with both classical and much contemporary 
economic thought.”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 38, at 357–58 (2001) (stating that property is more 
than simply distribution of “things”). 
51 Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012) 
[hereinafter Smith, The Economy of Concepts]; Smith, supra note 1. 
52 Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON J. WATCH 247 (2011), http://econjwatch.org/ 
articles/the-property-prism [http://perma.cc/Y8V3-4GT6]. 
53 Thomas Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061 (2012).  
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A. Living in Legoland 
Legos are great. Who can object to a legal theory built around Legos?  
In two recent articles, Property as the Law of Things and On the Economy 
of Concepts in Property, Professor Henry Smith analogizes his theory of 
property to the connections made possible by the popular childhood toy.54 
Rejecting the bundle-of-sticks understanding of property, Smith develops 
what he calls a “modular theory of property.”55 But the part of my 
childhood that the articles most reminded me of was not playing with 
Legos but playing a board game called “Rail Baron.” Following Smith’s 
lead in using toy metaphors, let me first explain Rail Baron. The goal of 
the game is simple: make money faster than your opponents can make 
money. You do this by buying railroads and traveling between cities based 
on the roll of the dice. Think hardcore Monopoly. Luck plays a role 
(excuse the pun), but in order to win you need to convince the other 
players that you are losing so that when they have to ride on someone 
else’s railroad, they choose your line and not the line of an opponent. My 
father was amazing at convincing everyone else that he was losing, even 
when all the evidence should have told us that he was winning. Similarly, 
Smith describes himself as the underdog,56 even though he and others who 
share his perspective on property are winning. Put differently, property law 
in the United States is amazingly stable, and therefore, the status quo does 
not need defending.      
Smith’s argument in both articles is fairly abstract and, with a few 
oblique exceptions contained in the footnotes, avoids singling out 
particular scholars for attack. But the underlying message is clear: 
information cost theories have more explanatory power than the theories 
offered up under the bundle-of-sticks/progressive property perspective. It 
is a point Smith echoes in a third article, a brief piece aptly titled, Property 
Is Not Just a Bundle of Rights.57 Opposite Smith are progressive scholars 
who are more inclined to accept the legal realist bundle-of-rights metaphor 
and to embrace progressive context based decision-making.58 Although 
still marshaling troops and harder to pin down in part because of an 
express embrace of pluralism, the progressive bundle-of-rights camp 
includes a who’s who of leading property professors.59 The Law of Things 
attacks these scholars by launching a trial balloon for the modular theory of 
                                                                                                                          
54 Smith, supra note 1, at 1708; Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2119. 
55 Smith, supra note 1, at 1695. 
56 Infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.   
57 Smith, supra note 37.   
58 See Smith, supra note 1, at 1716 (describing ways in which the opposing camp believes sticks 
can be detached from the bundle, customized, and interact with one another).   
59 A partial list of active participants would include professors Gregory Alexander, Hanoch 
Dagan, John Lovett, Eduardo Peñalver, Jedediah Purdy, Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler.   
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property. Layering on additional support grounded in a theory of 
linguistics and the mind, The Economy of Concepts furthers the argument 
that property is marked by simplicity of design and rules. Judging by the 
responses that have already been published, the modular theory has either 
already been shot down, or is at least on life support. The irony, of course, 
is that the respondents to date could not have been better selected to agree 
with the article. Smith’s frequent co-author, Merrill, spends the bulk of 
Property as Modularity highlighting points of agreement and the strengths 
he sees in Smith’s modular theory.60 Similarly, Professor Eric Claeys, 
although he launches into his critiques more quickly, begins by writing that 
Smith and Merrill’s series of articles developing the information and 
exclusion centered approach to property “have been more original and 
influential in American property scholarship than has work by anyone else 
in his and my cohort”61 and noting his general agreement with Smith on 
“how private property should be structured in practice.”62 But by the end of 
both responses, I imagine Smith thinking to himself, “with friends like 
these . . . .”63 
Smith’s most obvious contribution in these three articles is his 
argument that the bundle-of-rights understanding, by treating the sticks in 
the bundle in an isolated and easily disaggregated fashion, does a poor job 
describing property law.64 Merrill’s view is that the modular theory 
provides a better snapshot of property but is still incomplete because it fails 
to explain the incentivizing effects of property.65 Both The Law of Things 
and The Economy of Concepts take property law as it is and offer modular 
theory as a better description of what it is. As Claeys points out, such a 
descriptive theory does not address the more important question: is what is 
what should be?66 To return to Legoland, when you look around at how 
property works in the United States, it is possible to see all sorts of good 
                                                                                                                          
60 Thomas W. Merrill, Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 151 (2012), 
http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvol125_merrill.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4KY 
-NMEG]. 
61 Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of 
Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 133, 133 (2012), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
pdfs/forvol125_claeys.pdf [http://perma.cc/6RXA-8EHE]. 
62 Id. at 134.   
63 Many of my friends probably had similar thoughts after I published my critique of progressive 
property. See Rosser, supra note 44, at 108 (“The goal of this Essay is to pick a fight with progressive 
property scholars.”).   
64 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 37, at 286 (“In a bundle of sticks the sticks do not interact; you can 
add or subtract them at will, and still you will have a bundle with roughly the same properties. Not so 
with property.”). This is an argument that Smith and Merrill have made before. See Merrill & Smith, 
The Morality of Property, supra note 30, 1867–68 (suggesting that the bundle-of-sticks theory is 
misleading in property law and critiquing various academics who have recently written in support of 
it). 
65 Merrill, supra note 60, at 159–63. 
66 Claeys, supra note 61, at 139–40.   
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things. As Smith and Merrill have pointed out numerous times, limits on 
the forms of property, a principle embodied in numerus clausus, serve 
important informational values. Standardization lowers transaction costs, 
enhancing alienability and the settlement of disputes.67 The “blocks” 
(modules) of limited property types work well with exclusionary “blocks” 
to provide owners with security, a degree of liberty, and the incentive to 
create or capture ownership gains.68 Because of these advantages, 
information theorists such as Smith and Merrill “value stability over 
change,” Professor Jane Baron observes, in contrast with progressive 
scholars who “are far more receptive to change.”69 Smith acknowledges as 
much in The Law of Things, arguing in support of “traditional baselines 
that, while in need of constant improvement, are very worthy of 
explanation and a good deal of respect.”70       
If proposing an alternative to the bundle is the most obvious 
contribution, there is as much to be gleaned from Smith’s natural 
inclination to respect traditional baseline rules. After all, Smith is hardly 
the first scholar to attack the bundle-of-rights metaphor.71 Similarly, it is 
not as if progressive property scholars do not acknowledge the importance 
of the right to exclude; they simply deny its place as the sine qua non of 
property.72 Smith seems to agree, explaining, “[t]here is no interest in 
exclusion per se. Instead exclusion strategies, including the right to 
exclude, serve the interest in use.”73 But his agreement only goes so far: 
Smith claims that “[t]he exclusion strategy is the starting point in 
property.”74 Claeys faults The Law of Things for not focusing more on 
use,75 joining a number of property scholars who have prioritized use rights 
in recent articles.76 But such a critique, like the critique that descriptions of 
                                                                                                                          
67 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 30, at 14, 24–25 (using estates 
law to show how standardization can promote alienability). 
68 Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2115; Smith, supra note 37, at 281. 
69 Baron, supra note 2, at 944–45 (emphasis in original). 
70 Smith, supra note 1, at 1692. 
71 See Baron, supra note 2, at 922 n.8 (collecting sources); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Useless 
Property, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1373–74 n.24 (2011) (same). 
72 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 35; see also Baron, supra note 2, at 919 n.4 (collecting 
sources).   
73 Smith, supra note 1, at 1693; see also Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2115 
n.69; Smith, supra note 32, at 95. 
74 Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2115; see also id. at 2123. Making a 
relatively fine distinction, Smith argues first that “[a]t the core of [the] architecture [of property] is 
exclusion because it is a default, a convenient starting point.” Smith, supra note 37, at 282. He then 
goes on to argue, “[t]his does not mean that exclusion is the most important or ‘core’ value.” Id.   
75 Claeys, supra note 61, at 143. 
76 See generally Dyal-Chand, supra note 71; Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property 
Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008) (arguing that property theory should emphasize the idea of 
exclusion as the owner’s use of an agenda-setting authority); Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting 
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property’s recurring structural or architectural features neglect the 
dynamics internal to those features,77 is arguably a matter of emphasis. The 
Law of Things and, especially, The Economy of Concepts operate at a high 
level, providing a new way of conceiving the general features of property 
that does have certain explanatory advantages over the straw man versions 
of the bundle and legal realism Smith attacks.78 I am not convinced that the 
modular theory will find traction among legal scholars, even though it may 
be superior in some respects to the bundle-of-rights metaphor. But I am 
convinced that modular theory reflects a level of comfort with the status 
quo and an indifference to contextual concerns that I do not share.   
Gregory Alexander argues that “it takes a theory to beat a theory.”79 
Indeed, part of the goal of Alexander’s article, The Social-Obligation Norm 
in American Property Law, was to “offer an alternative” theory to the law-
and-economics approach to property scholarship.80 As a professor, I find 
Alexander’s position quite appealing. It offers the promise of validating 
scholarly work. But is Alexander right? The gap between the two scholarly 
camps seems less about theoretical disagreement than about emphasis and 
appetite for change.81 This is not to say that there are not important 
differences. There are. But differences in theory provide, at best, a partial 
explanation of these important differences. Over the years, progressive 
scholars have advanced a whole range of theories that push back against 
exclusion-centric understandings of property.82 Influential works, such as 
those discussed in Part III, Charles Reich’s The New Property, and Joseph 
Singer’s The Reliance Interest in Property, offer, in their own way, 
theories regarding the nature and characteristic of property that go beyond 
the right to exclude.83 Yet, what Singer calls the “castle model of 
                                                                                                                          
the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003) (arguing for a revised understanding of 
property theory that emphasizes a combination of acquisition, use, and disposal of property).  
77 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1854–60 
(2012); Davidson, supra note 43, at 1610–15.   
78 As Michael Heller writes, “the overwhelming evidence suggests that the notion of an open-
ended bundle of property rights is wrong.” Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 
YALE L.J. 1163, 1192 (1999). 
79 Gregory S. Alexander, Remarks at 2012 Law and Society Annual Meeting (June 8, 2012) 
(notes on file with author); Email from Gregory S. Alexander to Ezra Rosser (Aug. 17, 2011 7:59 PM 
EST) (on file with author). 
80 Alexander, supra note 9, at 750. 
81 In recent works, scholars in both camps have gone out of their way to acknowledge that the 
distance between them is not as great as it might seem. See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & 
EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 137, 205–07 (2012); Merrill, 
supra note 53, at 2063, 2088–89; Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2128.        
82 See, e.g., Rosser, supra note 44, at 116–23 (presenting Alexander’s social obligation theory, 
Peñalver’s virtue theory, and Singer’s democratic model).     
83 Reich, supra note 22; Singer, supra note 23. 
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property”84 continues its hold on the general public and limits the 
possibility of radical change.     
For Smith, radical change is something to be avoided. The bundle 
metaphor seems to welcome change, begging as it does questions such as 
“what would happen if we took this stick out of the bundle or rearranged 
property rights in this way?” Rejecting this invitation, The Law of Things 
highlights “[t]he importance of explaining why structures are not otherwise 
than they are.”85 The article continues by arguing that the features of 
property “can be tweaked, but are not as detachable as the bundle view 
would have it.”86 Traditional rules, Smith suggests, are generally good 
rules that at most should be reformed, not ripped apart in ways suggested 
by legal realists.87 The Economy of Concepts frames this reification of 
traditional rules in terms of a defense of formalism.88 According to Smith, 
“[t]he most useful notion of formalism . . . is relative indifference to 
context.”89 Formal rules are subject to the critique that “they are not 
responsive enough to societal needs,”90 but Smith deals with this critique 
by arguing that it would be costly to move from formalism to context-
based law.91 Even changing isolated rules so that they better reflect 
particular values is dangerous because the impact of such changes may be 
felt by the larger structure and may threaten stability.92 If there is to be 
more radical change, or what Smith terms “remodularization,” then such 
changes should be “channeled to the legislatures.”93 Locating the authority 
for substantive change in the legislative bodies reflects an appreciation for 
democratic decision-making but also serves to narrow the field of changes 
realistically on the table. Change is bad, according to Smith, because the 
means employed by the existing system do a good job reducing transaction 
and information costs. Smith explains that the bundle-of-rights theory of 
property, by ignoring “delineation cost,” makes it “deceptively attractive to 
move in the direction of more governance style contextualized inquiry.”94   
Of course, that is an essential question: whether the gains of moving 
from a starting assumption of respect for traditional rules to an approach 
                                                                                                                          
84 Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, 
and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 314–22 (2006); see also di Robilant, supra note 
49, at 403–06; Gupta, supra note 26, at 530–32.        
85 Smith, supra note 1, at 1699.   
86 Id. at 1700.   
87 Id. at 1714.   
88 Smith elsewhere notes that “[u]nreflective conceptualism or formalism is a nonstarter,” but then 
advocates in a form of what might be called reflective formalism. Smith, supra note 37, at 281.   
89 Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2105. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 2127.   
92 Smith, supra note 1, at 1719.   
93 Id. at 1724.   
94 Id. at 1717.  
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more open to contextualized inquiry will exceed the costs of such a 
move.95 And it is that question, not theory, per se, that I believe best 
explains many of the debates currently animating property scholarship. 
Even though Smith attacks declarations by fiat that defend ad hocery,96 the 
same criticism can be leveled against the assumption that “[p]romoting the 
promiscuous employment of contextual information in property” amounts 
to ignoring the information cost of moving away from traditional rules.97 
Moving away from traditional rules will impose costs, but those costs are 
likely to not be distributed evenly. Instead, such costs are likely to be borne 
by those who have traditionally benefitted or stand to benefit from such 
rules. Maintaining the status quo, however, also imposes costs, primarily 
on those required to honor the property rights of others even though they 
enjoy far less benefit from the existing structure. The assumption that the 
costs of change will exceed the benefits is just that, an assumption.98   
Fortunately for information theorists, this assumption is widely shared. 
Although lawyers observe many ways in which property must 
accommodate the interests of neighbors, of non-owners, and of society, 
public understanding of property is more in line with Blackstone’s “sole 
and despotic dominion.”99 And though even information theorists will 
acknowledge that property is more complex than that, caveats aside, their 
emphasis on the centrality of exclusion is not far removed from the castle 
model.100 Put differently, if we consider the debate as more than an 
academic exercise and instead an attempt to influence public debate and 
understanding of property, information theorists have a huge advantage. As 
Smith highlights in The Economy of Concepts, simple theories that 
“capture known facts in a shorter description” are attractive, in part 
because they are generalizable.101 Moreover, the status quo and existing 
                                                                                                                          
95 To return to information cost theory, excessive focus on limited forms of property might 
impose costs that exceed the transaction cost reduction benefits. See Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of 
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distributions of property have tremendous pull on people. The possibility 
of change-induced loss generally outweighs the possibility of offsetting 
gains in all but rare moments of crisis.102 Behavioral economists might 
explain a status quo bias in terms of risk aversion or the endowment 
effect,103 but for whatever reason, the demand for meaningful change in 
property law is generally muted.104 But reading The Law of Things and The 
Economy of Concepts makes it seem as if the status quo—finding form 
here as a celebration of simple exclusionary rules—needs defending.   
The odd part is that both camps seem to think that they are losing. A 
Statement on Progressive Property, written by Alexander, Peñalver, 
Singer, and Underkuffler, begins, “[t]he common conception of property as 
protection of individual control over valuable resources is both intuitively 
and legally powerful.”105 It continues with an explanation of why the 
common conception is “inadequate.”106 Similarly, Smith bills the modular 
theory as a “clear contrast with conventional property theories.”107 
According to Smith, the idea that property law is the law of things “suffers 
from a serious image problem.”108 Smith presents traditional rules in 
general as under siege by legal realists and post-realists. Smith complains, 
“The burden is shifted to anyone who wants to deny the relevance of 
context, and when using context can be shown to be congruent with a 
virtuous purpose, objections are labeled as formalistic or worse.”109 As in 
Rail Baron, both progressives and conservatives seem to be attempting to 
claim that they are losing. In one sense they both may be right: information 
theorists arguably have the support of the masses (and they know it110), 
while progressive property scholars are likely to find their theories better 
received at most academic conferences. But in the larger sense, my team 
(to admit the obvious) is losing. Change in property law is slow and, given 
public sentiment, information theorists command the high ground.    
But instead of admitting defeat or pleading for mercy, I want to 
                                                                                                                          
102 See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Identity: Vulnerability and Insecurity in the 
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political change is perhaps best exemplified by the Great Depression and President Roosevelt’s 
progressive, experimental responses. See, e.g., David M. Kennedy, What the New Deal Did, 124 POL. 
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103 See Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 
93, 115–16 (2011) (summarizing risk aversion and endowment effect studies).   
104 See generally Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 
546 (1989) (describing change in the American legal system as reactive, not proactive).    
105 Alexander et al., supra note 5, at 743.   
106 Id.   
107 Smith, supra note 1, at 1716.   
108 Id. at 1691.   
109 Id. at 1718; Smith, supra note 37, at 283 (same quote). 
110 See Smith, supra note 37, at 287 (arguing that in contrast with the bundle-of-rights perspective, 
the “architectural,” or modular, view of property “takes lay views seriously”); Smith, supra note 32, at 
114 (arguing in favor of “lay intuition”).   
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question the value of continuing to rationalize and justify the status quo. 
Even though Smith claims that “the architectural view raises the 
overlooked question of why things could not be otherwise,”111 my 
impression is that it does an admirable job explaining why things are the 
way they are but does very little to disprove the possibility of change for 
the better. Why could things not be otherwise? For Smith, the exclusionary 
rule works because it leaves implicit “many of the protected privileges of 
use.”112 By placing such significant weight on the value of simplicity, 
Smith fails to consider the costs of “shortcut[s]” to non-owners of a static 
system that keeps property rights implicit and uncovered.113 In his response 
to modular theory, Claeys criticizes economic-based legal scholarship for 
having a purely instrumentalist view of normative categories and for 
“bootstrapping” on existing doctrine.114 I would take this critique a step 
further and argue that economic rationalizing theories confuse descriptions 
of the way the world is and the predictive value of models for normative 
value.115 The fact that we have a certain set of building blocks, or modules, 
does not mean that other blocks would not work or that the arrangement of 
the existing blocks is necessarily best. Smith’s effort to read out the 
exceptions and to construct a simplistic model of property116 ends up 
reading as an attempt to justify the status quo and to praise the system. It is 
fun to think about things in terms of Legos, but the real world and the law 
of property are much more complex. The modular theory provides a novel 
and interesting way of thinking about and describing the importance of 
“things” in property and the law as it exists. But Smith’s concern that the 
bundle of rights “downplays the cost of innovation” is overly speculative 
in light of existing problems in the architecture of property and 
distribution.117 The status quo is fully capable of defending itself and the 
problems of property and distribution need proposals for improvement and 
not further elaboration on how great the rules work together.     
B. A Narrow Vision  
Thomas Merrill’s recent scholarship offers an alternative to the 
modular analogy as part of an attack on the bundle of rights that stands as 
both an ode and an elegy to property. Merrill sings property’s praises, 
                                                                                                                          
111 Smith, supra note 1, at 1694 (emphasis added).  
112 Smith, The Economy of Concepts, supra note 51, at 2104.   
113 Smith, supra note 37, at 282 (emphasis in original).   
114 Claeys, supra note 61, at 135, 147.   
115 See Peñalver, supra note 40, at 860.   
116 See Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON J. WATCH 255, 258 
(2011) (highlighting the reductionism of information cost theory), http://econjwatch.org/articles/the-
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doing so in a way that attempts to reduce property from a system with 
different goals and modes of governance to a more narrow understanding 
of what Merrill labels the “property strategy.”118 He also argues that the 
bundle should be replaced by a prism, the advantage of which is that a 
prism metaphor highlights the importance of one’s perspective when 
considering property.119 Merrill’s reductionist project boils away the role of 
governance, equity, and even the state, leaving a condensed, more pure, 
version of property. His purpose seems to be to draw a smaller circle 
around what counts as “property.” In contrast to more holistic 
understandings of property that prioritize the role of the state and recognize 
that property is regulated in many different and sometimes conflicting 
ways, Merrill offers a narrow vision of property’s “elemental features.”120  
Although Merrill’s emphasis is on what makes the property strategy work 
and how it operates in various settings, his closing acknowledgment of the 
disadvantages of the property strategy is fairly damning to his larger 
reductionist project. The disadvantages are significant enough that they 
convert what was intended to be a celebration of simple property rules into 
an elegy.   
Framed as a descriptive argument, Merrill argues that the property 
strategy is used by all human societies and consists of a limited set of 
characteristics. Merrill notes that “[p]roperty law is highly complex, and all 
of its details cannot be reduced to the elemental features of the property 
strategy,” but he goes on to argue that the best way to understand property 
is to “consider what makes property work in its most elemental 
applications.”121 For those familiar with his prior work, Merrill’s answer to 
“what makes property work” is not exactly new,122 though it is introduced 
in a surprising way. In order to deflect the attacks on exclusion-centered 
approaches to property, Merrill adopts a conciliatory tone, writing, 
“[r]ather than joust over whether exclusion entails other attributes, or 
whether it is or is not compatible with various qualifications, it is more 
profitable to specify the central characteristics with greater precision.”123 
While such language suggests a move away from the scholarly debates of 
the past decade, readers are disabused of that idea in the very next 
paragraph. Merrill asserts, “two prerogatives characterize ownership in all 
of its manifestations . . . residual managerial authority . . . [and] residual 
accessionary rights.”124 Merrill later acknowledges that resources can be 
                                                                                                                          
118 Merrill, supra note 53. 
119 Merrill, supra note 52, at 247.  
120 Merrill, supra note 53, at 2063. 
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122 See Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 30.   
123 Merrill, supra note 53, at 2067.   
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subjected to a range of obligations and rights that do not fit neatly into 
these two prerogatives, but claims that “[t]he property strategy requires 
that the obligations imposed on the owner be sufficiently limited in number 
and scope.”125 Picking up the lance once more, Merrill explains that 
residual managerial authority and residual accessionary rights are but more 
precise characterizations of the right to exclude.126   
As an idea that is not tethered to the U.S. legal system, the property 
strategy theory, although not based on natural law, is a simplified 
proclamation about the nature of property itself, not about property as it is 
found in any particular country. According to The Property Strategy, 
property law differs across societies as a matter of degree but not in its 
fundamental traits. Merrill argues that “the basic architecture of the 
strategy—owner, object, residual authority, and accessionary rights—is the 
same in all contexts and defines the property strategy relative to other 
strategies for organizing the use of resources.”127 The examples that Merrill 
chooses—a family farm, Native American tribes, and the household—
support the idea that there is a basic architecture, but do so with the 
tendency, found in most efficiency-based models of the law, to overlook 
counter-narratives. Thus, Merrill’s stylized family farm is just that, a 
family farm, not a gigantic agribusiness defined by its corporate form. The 
family farm’s accessionary gains or losses are residual for Merrill in that 
they come after the farm has met its obligations, but they are not products 
of state support such as infrastructure improvements and farm subsidies. 
The same sort of reductionism informs Merrill’s treatment of Indian tribes. 
By now it is well documented that, despite claims to the contrary by 
outsiders, Indians historically employed what Merrill calls the property 
strategy, albeit in ways that are often distinct from non-Indian expectations 
regarding ownership.128 But by quickly establishing that Indians and other 
indigenous peoples often have used rights to goods or land, any differences 
across tribes are treated as irrelevant.129 Similarly, the household is treated 
in a summary fashion that shows the property strategy at work but does not 
bother to discuss complications to the general observation that property 
rights are at work, even in the intimate setting of the household.130 Yet, 
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property rights in the household have shifted dramatically over the last two 
centuries and, in many respects, remain contested as society continues its 
long move away from rigid patriarchy. In all three examples, the basic 
architecture can be seen, in part because the description is kept basic and 
does not show where similarities in regulating property break down or are 
subject to constant change.   
The takeaway lessons Merrill draws from his examples are surprising 
and not entirely supported. As isolated observation points, Merrill’s three 
examples do support the idea that “the property strategy is at work” in 
many contexts where resources are subject to exclusionary control by an 
individual.131 But he goes on to state that “neither the state, nor the right of 
alienation is a necessary feature of the property strategy.”132 Merrill 
acknowledges that many scholars see property as wholly a product of the 
state, but Merrill argues that, because the property strategy can be observed 
in informal settings and tribal societies without a modern (Western) 
government, the state can be useful, but is not required. In discussing this 
independent grounding for property law, Merrill’s view of the role of the 
state is squarely laissez-faire. Property rights are good and the role of the 
state is to support the property strategy and the authority of owners—
Merrill’s examples are permitting self-help and facilitating market 
exchange.133 Tellingly, Merrill adds that “the state has a role in staying its 
own hand from interfering with the prerogatives of owners.”134 Although 
Merrill calls this government “forbearance,” it is also transparently a call 
for a laissez-faire approach by the government, with an emphasis on 
“protect[ing] the expectations of owners.”135   
The problem with these takeaways—that the state is not required for 
the property strategy and that forbearance should be emphasized—is that 
they do not necessarily flow from the observation that a property strategy 
can be observed in many contexts. A rich and nuanced description of 
informal norms regarding property rights can make the state seem 
unimportant, but the operation of informal control may depend on the 
state’s background rules and protections.136 Put differently, the state’s role 
may be hidden or seem to be of secondary importance in Shasta County,137 
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on a family farm, among Native Americans, or around the family dining 
room, but that does not mean the state is unimportant or that the property 
strategy exists independently of the state.138 Similarly, Merrill argues that 
“the property strategy will be severely tested” by “bandit state[s that] 
expropriate productive effort by citizens to enrich those who control the 
state apparatus.”139 But this argument is based on the assumption that the 
property strategy is good. Does progressive taxation of property owners in 
favor of the propertyless amount to banditry? Or is the reverse true: can 
calls for government forbearance by wealthy property owners and state 
support of the property strategy amount to expropriation (of labor if not 
property)? Without delving into context, into the details of each society, it 
is impossible to know whether “threatening the security of property rights” 
is a bad or good thing.140 Though Merrill’s language suggests an answer to 
this question regardless of context, to take an extreme example, consider 
slavery (secure property rights in another person). Or, less extreme but also 
an example of a constructive threat to the security of property, consider 
rigid forms of extreme social and wealth inequality coupled with limited 
mobility and a frayed safety net.      
Merrill’s presentation of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
property strategy is quite insightful and compelling. He shows how the 
property strategy: (1) is derived from local knowledge; (2) provides 
incentives for owners to maximize the value of resources; (3) allows for 
scalability of inputs; (4) goes a long way towards avoiding the tragedy of 
the commons; (5) is a necessary precondition for exchange because it 
reduces transaction costs; (6) can serve to diffuse political power; and (7) 
helps individuals find personal meaning and fulfill life goals.141 These 
advantages are real and would be acknowledged by most property scholars, 
regardless of their progressive or conservative leanings. Unfortunately, 
they are also subject to qualification, and in certain contexts these 
advantages, especially numbers six and seven, may not materialize. Put 
differently, the disadvantages of the property strategy may overwhelm 
some of the advantages. Because the advantages identified by Merrill are 
less controversial, I will spend more time exploring the disadvantages 
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presented by Merrill.  
First, the property strategy, according to Merrill, can create new 
externalities. These externalities can be positive or negative, but by 
dividing the world into separate spheres, the strategy may create incentives 
to pass along costs (where there are negative externalities) or to not act for 
the benefit of others (where there are positive externalities). The second 
disadvantage Merrill identifies is that “granting property rights can create 
monopolies with troublesome social consequences.”142 Third, private 
property can interfere with services that require networks and linkages 
(public access networks), which add value to private property, albeit by 
compromising on the use of the property strategy.143 Fourth, the 
exclusionary aspect of property—that it gives authority over property and 
concentrates gains and losses in the hands of owners—means that the 
property strategy “enhances the risk individual owners face.”144 Finally, 
Merrill acknowledges that the property strategy “tends to promote 
inequality.”145 In the case of all these disadvantages, Merrill acknowledges 
that the solution may be greater state involvement in regulating property or 
in limiting the property strategy.146   
The last two disadvantages are the most damning. As Merrill observes, 
“[s]ome would see the tendency for the property strategy to produce 
inequality as sufficient grounds to condemn the institution as a matter of 
distributive justice.”147 In a move that progressives are all too familiar 
with, Merrill immediately moves from this observation to raise the idea 
that property is theft and Marx and Engels’s position that private property 
should be abolished.148 Though this might be considered a mild form of 
red-baiting, Merrill goes on to note that many others “still find property’s 
tendency to generate inequality troubling.”149 Merrill argues that the 
welfare state in the form of “government safety nets” can mitigate the 
downsides of risk associated with property, but funding such social 
insurance through taxation amounts to a further qualification on the 
property strategy.150 Though Merrill’s discussion of inequality does not 
include discussion of safety nets, his argument logically includes the 
possibility that the welfare state can reduce systematic inequality in a 
similar way to how it lessens the downside risks associated with a property 
strategy. Merrill concludes The Property Strategy by noting that because of 
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the disadvantages associated with it, “we are unlikely to see any society 
adopt an unadulterated property strategy.”151 
Though framed as a celebration of the property strategy, Merrill’s 
account of the connection between property and inequality overwhelms the 
rest of his argument explaining and celebrating the strategy’s ubiquity. 
When the pervasive inequality in the United States is read into Merrill’s 
theoretical argument, a passage whose tone is intellectual ends up serving 
as an elegy for property. Merrill writes: 
Extreme inequality in the distribution of property undermines 
all the reasons previously advanced as strengths of the 
property strategy. If only a small number of people own 
property, then the property strategy loses its advantage of 
tapping into dispersed local knowledge. Further, incentives to 
be productive will exist for only a few, there will be no 
reduction in external transaction costs due to the presence of 
large numbers of potential partners for exchange, and the 
institution of property will offer little in the way of checks 
and balances against concentrated power. In other words, the 
tendency toward inequality should be disturbing to the 
friends of property, as well as to the more conventional 
egalitarians animated by considerations of distributive 
justice.152 
Reconciling this statement on the dangers of inequality with the 
generally positive view of property found in the rest of the article is only 
possible if one imagines that inequality is not a significant concern. 
Otherwise, as Merrill acknowledges, inequality could undermine all of 
property’s advantages.153 Friends of property (in which category I place 
myself, despite the likelihood that my argument to destabilize property will 
be read as a rejection of property) should be disturbed by the connection 
between inequality and property. But judging by the inattention to 
property’s tendency to promote inequality, and to inequality in general, at 
best such friends have been fairly silent. There are, of course, scholars who 
are concerned about inequality, but their interventions tend to be indirect or 
limited. Whether because the system is taken for granted or because of 
justifiable skepticism about the value of theory, few property scholars 
consider the way inequality undermines the justifications and nature of the 
property system at large.      
Although not intended to do so, Merrill’s attack on the bundle of rights 
offers a partial explanation for scholarly inattention to inequality. Similar 
                                                                                                                          
151 Id. at 2094.    
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
 426 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:397 
to Smith, Merrill argues that the bundle is a poor metaphor because it fails 
to provide answers to the questions we ask of property.154 The “formless” 
bundle, Merrill explains, “highlights the complexity of the institution 
without offering any views about its nature or content.”155 One could 
respond by noting that this statement reveals its own fallacy; namely, the 
fact that the bundle highlights property’s complexity itself says something 
about the nature of property, especially when contrasted with Merrill’s 
own effort to distill property into its essential characteristics, most 
prominently exclusion.156 In place of the bundle, Merrill proposes that a 
prism is a better metaphor because it captures the idea that property “takes 
on a different coloration when viewed from different angles.”157 The first 
two sides of Merrill’s four-sided prism are not surprising, as they closely 
track Merrill’s prior work. From the perspective of “strangers”, Merrill’s 
first side of the prism, property can be reduced to an easily understood 
exclusionary command.158 If the first perspective is a version of Merrill’s 
1998 Right to Exclude article,159 the second side of the prism corresponds 
with Smith and Merrill’s pioneering article from 2000 on numerus 
clausus.160 The perspective of “potential transactors” is a bit more nuanced, 
but mandatory standardization of forms ensures that information costs are 
kept in check.   
The information cost theory loses its punch when it comes to the third 
and fourth sides of the prism described by Merrill. On the prism’s third 
side, property, as perceived by those within the zone of privity, allows for 
“a tremendous diversity of rules and practices.”161 Merrill argues that even 
here, information cost theory explains the abundance of forms because 
those within the zone of privity can learn the particular contract-like rules 
easily.162 But such an argument is fairly analogous to Merrill’s own 
critique of the bundle in that it says nothing about the forms property will 
take when information costs are not controlling.163 Merrill faces the same 
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challenge when attempting to squeeze the fourth side of the prism—the 
perspective on property of neighbors, or more broadly, “anyone who 
experiences significant external effects from the way . . . property is 
managed”—into the information cost theory.164 Here too, there are 
“relatively high information costs.”165 This broad category does not lend 
itself to a simple exclusion-based theory of property, unless the effects are 
thought to invade protected property rights,166 or to a contractual 
relationship since the parties are not in contract. In a move open to 
contestation by those who see exceptions as integral to how rules are 
understood, Merrill argues that on this side of the prism, “[w]here external 
effects are concerned, context is everything.”167   
In many respects, Merrill’s prism proposal signals a willingness to 
enter into peace negotiations with progressive scholars. Although it seems 
to stand at odds with the neo-natural law aspects of The Property Strategy, 
Merrill describes property as “a social institution.”168 Merrill minimizes the 
distance between essentialists who emphasize exclusion and nominalists 
who reject the idea that property can be simplified in this way by arguing 
that the disagreement “reduces to one stick.”169 By focusing as much as he 
does in The Property Prism on elements of property that do not rest as 
comfortably with the information cost theory, on the sides of the prism that 
do not embody the property strategy but instead are complex and 
contextual, Merrill creates space to reconcile conservative descriptions of 
property with progressive critique. Put differently, the status quo bias 
observable in celebrations of existing rules without regard either to how 
those rules are experienced by those excluded from enjoying property or to 
the possibility of improving on the existing structure, may be a matter of 
choice, not oversight. With the final two perspectives on property found in 
The Property Prism, and especially with the acknowledgement of the 
disadvantages of property discussed in The Property Strategy, the choice 
of information theorists to focus on describing the system and applauding 
how it works cannot be dismissed as ignorance of the costs of the system. 
Instead, this choice signals a belief that overall the rules work, or that there 
is a need, as a normative matter, to fight against the possibility that the 
rules will be further degraded by the long shadow of legal realism. By 
acknowledging the different perspectives one can have on property and 
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property’s disadvantages, Merrill invites both agreement with regard to his 
description of property and disagreement about the power existing rules 
should hold over the imagination.170    
III.  OVERRELIANCE 
It is difficult to identify a single strand of scholarship as important to 
progressive thought as information cost theory has recently been for 
conservative approaches to property. But arguably, at the heart of 
progressive property scholarship is the idea that those without title but with 
a history of enjoying particular forms of property have some sort of right to 
such property. Whereas conservatives have turned to formalism, 
progressives emphasize the ways in which access to resources or a long 
history of use can, and sometimes should, be graced with the property 
label.171 Published nearly fifty years ago, Charles Reich’s The New 
Property argued that government largess, including everything from 
business licenses to welfare, should be associated with property 
protections.172 A quarter century ago, Joseph Singer published The 
Reliance Interest in Property, in which he argued that a reliance on 
property—focusing on workers’ rights to a steel mill—can mature into a 
recognized property right.173 These two works stand as two of the most 
important contributions to progressive property scholarship since Felix 
Cohen’s work on legal realism earlier in the twentieth century.174 Though 
the two articles were written at different historical moments, they propose 
similar solutions to the problems faced by the poor and the vulnerable. 
They argue that some of the poor already have rights that should be 
recognized as property rights, with the goal being incorporation into the 
existing structure. These articles were radical in a sense: arguing that new 
property and reliance interests should be recognized as part of the 
generally accepted law pushes against the boundaries of property law. But 
these arguments are also limited in that they embrace property law’s 
vocabulary and legitimacy.175 Escaping this limit requires extending the 
                                                                                                                          
170 The same is arguably true for Smith who, though generally favoring an exclusion strategy, 
acknowledges that a governance strategy may be appropriate when the stakes are high enough. Henry 
E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1757 (2004). One could agree with 
his description of property rules as largely exclusionary yet disagree about whether exclusion or 
governance is best depending on whether one sees the stakes as routinely high or routinely low.   
171 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 9.  
172 Reich, supra note 22. 
173 Singer, supra note 23. 
174 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809 (1935).  
175 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPERTY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY 
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 370–77 (making a similar argument about The New 
Property); Williams, supra note 7, at 324 (same). 
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insights from both works such that entrance is available even to those who 
cannot ground their rights to basic security on property-type claims of 
right.176   
Given their canonical status, I am going to be brief in my overview of 
The New Property and The Reliance Interest in Property. According to 
Reich, property is important because it protects individuals from the 
state.177 With the rise of the modern bureaucratic state, more and more 
people are dependent on the government for their livelihood.178 Grouping 
everything from broadcast rights and professional licensing to government 
contracts and welfare, Reich argues that government largess should be 
treated as a new form of property and protected as such.179 By showing that 
there is not much difference between new property and traditional 
property, Reich paved the way for the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize 
procedural rights connected with welfare receipt.180 The promise of 
Goldberg, contained in a case footnote citing Reich for the idea that 
welfare is a form of property, was not taken up in subsequent cases and 
was finally rejected when President Clinton signed welfare reform into 
law.181 Despite this revealed limitation, Reich had made his scholarly 
mark.182 New property was here to stay and it forced a reconceptualization 
of property generally, opening up entire new areas to property scholarship 
and showing the overlap between old and new property.   
Singer’s masterful The Reliance Interest in Property similarly inspired 
a generation of progressive scholarship. The hornbook version of the 
article shows how a history of use of particular properties by non-owners 
                                                                                                                          
176 Put differently, escaping this limit requires adopting an approach that more extensively “wipes 
the intellectual slate clean and reimagines property afresh.” Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Ownership and 
Human Flourishing: An Exploratory Overview, 24 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 430, 452–53 (2013).   
177 Reich, supra note 22, at 733. 
178 See id. at 737 (detailing the scope of governmental employment and the state’s “vast intangible 
wealth,” which have created a society in which “[h]ardly any citizen leads his life without at least 
partial dependence on wealth flowing through the giant government syphon”). 
179 Id. at 744–46.   
180 Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970), with 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2012) 
(illustrating the Court’s treatment of public assistance as akin in some respects to entitlements whereas 
through welfare reform that characterization was specifically eliminated). 
181 As Professor James Stern explains, the Supreme Court “balked at the idea of extending takings 
protection” to new property. Stern, supra note 126, at 281; see also Christopher Serkin, Passive 
Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 357–59 (2014) 
(detailing the Court’s refusal to “expand affirmative federal constitutional obligations to provide 
welfare rights” after Goldberg). Merrill dismisses new property cases as “outliers,” arguing that “the 
concept of property has been fudged.” Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 30, at 752. The welfare-
reform bill President Clinton signed in August 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, was an “end to the 
statutory entitlement to cash assistance, replacing it with a block grant.” PETER EDELMAN, SO RICH, SO 
POOR: WHY IT’S SO HARD TO END POVERTY IN AMERICA 86–87 (2013).  
182 See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
751, 767 tbl. I (1996) (listing The New Property as the fourth most-cited article of all time).  
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can, with time, become the foundation for legal rights associated with 
those properties.183 Framed as a story about the reliance interests of 
workers and their community in the context of the closing of steel mills in 
Youngstown, Ohio,184 Singer argues that judges could have used existing 
strains of property law doctrine to protect the reliance interests of union 
workers.185 Though U.S. Steel asserted a right to unilaterally control the 
destiny of the plants, including the right to destroy the plants, Singer 
argued that the law could have and should protect the right of workers to 
buy the plants in order to keep them operational.186 The article in many 
ways serves as a blueprint for progressive property scholarship: it attacks 
the idea of the free market,187 draws attention to the social obligations of 
ownership,188 and emphasizes recognized positive rights.189 These ripples 
have spread across the scholarly horizon. A less frequently observed aspect 
of The Reliance Interest in Property is that it is grounded; it presents a new 
theory for understanding property but does not lose sight of how the law 
impacts people. Its lengthy discussion of the political economy of plant 
closings could have been spun off into a separate article. But by building 
his reliance interest argument around the historical moment, Singer shows 
how theory can inform practice and, perhaps more unusual among property 
scholars where theory is often divorced from practice, how context can 
inform theory.          
Together, Reich and Singer show the importance of labels, of 
identifying something as “property.” Whether the subject is denial of 
welfare benefits or plant closings, classifying something as “property” can 
lead to greater legal protection. Though Reich and Singer deployed it to 
advocate for the vulnerable, the idea that defining something as a property 
right can provide individuals additional legal protection is neither 
inherently progressive nor conservative. For example, Richard Epstein 
employs the power of the “property” label to defend against state 
regulation.190 By embracing all the sticks of the bundle as “property” 
                                                                                                                          
183 See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property Revisited, 7 UNBOUND: HARV. J. 
LEGAL LEFT 79, 79 (2011), http://legalleft.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Singer_Reliance-Interest-
Revisited.pdf [http://perma.cc/L3TQ-LS4Y]. 
184 For more on plant closings, see Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, 
and America’s Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1758 (1993), and Staughton Lynd, Towards 
a Not-For-Profit Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition and Use of Industrial 
Property, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 13, 13–14 (1987) (focusing on Youngstown).    
185 Singer, supra note 23, at 621. 
186 Id. at 617–21. 
187 Id. at 633. 
188 Id. at 659–60. 
189 Id. at 663. 
190 See Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of 
Private Property, 8 ECON J. WATCH 223, 224 (2011), http://econjwatch.org/articles/bundle-of-rights-
theory-as-a-bulwark-against-statist-conceptions-of-private-property [http://perma.cc/MQH7-7NRV] 
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subject to the Takings Clause, Epstein challenges the idea that the bundle’s 
disaggregating potential gives more space for progressive interventions in 
private property.191 Saying someone has a “property right” to something, 
whether to an object or to a state of affairs, suggests that that person has a 
legally protected expectation. For those for whom the status of their right is 
a question, ascribing the label can be empowering and can be used to 
defend against the operations of the state or the market.192 But there is a 
downside to this move as well. If the vulnerable are incorporated into the 
system using theories such as new property or the reliance interest, it 
arguably serves to reaffirm and support the existing structure. This is 
especially true where the argument is not that the theories are novel but 
that they reflect existing law, or at least that existing law provides ample 
space for them.   
Whether the incorporation strategy evident in The New Property and 
The Reliance Interest in Property is a good or bad thing depends crucially 
on context. Are the claims that rights should be treated as property 
legitimate? Does incorporation arrest broader challenges to the structure? 
Are property rights the proper form of protection or are other avenues more 
appropriate? Even under a property law regime that accepts claims to 
rights tied to theories of new property or reliance interests, what groups 
remain excluded and how should their rights be recognized? The answers 
to these questions are necessarily context specific and, as such, defy all-
encompassing claims. Taking as a given a commitment to the idea that the 
law should work for all, not just the privileged, the promise and limits of 
Reich’s and Singer’s works raise the broad question of whether property 
law is something you should work with or work against.  
Of course, one response to these questions is to try to limit the 
discussion, to reduce the scope of acceptable scholarship. James Stern ends 
his recent article, Property’s Constitution, with a call for “renewed 
emphasis on doctrinal consistency and symmetry,” which he explains, 
“may supply a route through the tangled maze of normative argumentation 
that surrounds the institution of property and reduce the occasions for 
unfettered moral theorizing.”193 At first glance, Stern’s article itself seems 
to do just this. Stern offers a theory for the Court’s takings jurisprudence 
                                                                                                                          
(arguing the “bundle-of-rights image” of property “offers the best path to preserving the institution of 
limited government”). 
191 Id.     
192 Notably, critical race theory scholars faulted the critical legal studies movement for treating 
rights dismissively for this reason. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing 
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404–05 (1987); see also John 
Hardwick, The Schism Between Minorities and the Critical Legal Studies Movement: Requiem for a 
Heavyweight?, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 137, 154–55 (1991) (describing the split between critical 
race scholars and critical legal studies scholars).          
193 Stern, supra note 126, at 326.   
 432 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:397 
that, as an explanation, arguably accomplishes his stated goal: “to make 
sense of the law we have.”194 But in doing so, Stern argues that no 
compensation is owed when the government takes away “new property” 
entitlements such as welfare.195 While this position may accord with the 
Supreme Court, Stern’s argument is not simply descriptive. Instead, Stern 
argues, “[i]f a person loses a property right and the right does not then shift 
to the government or to another private party, the person has been deprived 
of property but has not suffered a taking.”196 Moreover, in its embrace of 
doctrine as the limits of inquiry, Property’s Constitution ends up 
advocating a normative vision of property as control over things, a concept 
that Stern argues should be treated separately from “the distribution of 
material wealth.”197 Again, the problem with this position is not that it is 
inaccurate—as a description of the Supreme Court’s treatment of property, 
it seems fairly accurate—but that it stakes out a normative position even as 
it seeks to silence other perspectives on the morality of property. Stern may 
be right, but a theory that sees property primarily as a tool to protect wealth 
inequality, not as a tool separate from distribution, seems equally 
plausible.198 Answering theory with formalism is comforting for those 
seeking explanations but not if the goal is to understand what property 
should become.       
The argument that concerns about social obligations ought to be 
channeled almost entirely through tax-and-transfer programs amounts to a 
similar effort to take issues of inequality off the table. In The Affirmative 
Duties of Property Owners, Robert Ellickson attacks the idea that property 
law is the proper arena for tackling issues of redistribution.199 Citing 
“[c]onsiderations of efficiency, horizontal equity, and relative institutional 
competence,” Ellickson argues that distributional goals are best addressed 
through tax-and-transfer programs, not property law.200 Although not 
framed as such, Ellickson’s position can be summarized as a property-
centric version of Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s earlier and well-
                                                                                                                          
194 Id. at 285.   
195 Id. at 317.   
196 Id. at 284.   
197 Id. at 285. But see Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 416–17 (2012) (“Even physical property is far less amenable to 
consolidated control than is sometimes thought. Most ownership rights are qualified. . . . In the eyes of 
some theorists, these limits are exceptional; in the eyes of others, these limits are the norm. Either way, 
property does not always or necessarily entail control.” (footnotes omitted)). 
198 See Christopher Serkin, Affirmative Constitutional Commitments: The State’s Obligations to 
Property Owners, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 109, 115 (2013) (explaining that to reduce 
the role of the state to protecting private ordering amounts to “benefitting the rich at the expense of the 
poor—the wealth of the few over the welfare of the many”).    
199 Ellickson, supra note 7, at 44.   
200 Id. at 66.   
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cited tax-not-legal-rules argument.201 And it suffers the same flaws. A 
recent article by Zachary Liscow does an excellent job laying these out.202  
Liscow shows that even taking the efficiency-through-taxation solution on 
its own terms, it does not serve as a generalizable rule because of tax-based 
inefficiencies. Liscow explains, “redistribution through legal rules may be 
inefficient and costly, but so is redistribution through taxation.”203 The idea 
that redistributive legal rules should not be implemented because of 
problems of horizontal equity, Liscow notes, “amounts to holding the 
desperately needed aid for the poor hostage to the desire to help all of the 
poor.”204 But the biggest flaw in Kaplow and Shavell’s, and now 
Ellickson’s, taxes-are-more-efficient argument is the framing of the choice. 
Claiming that scholars should abandon distributive concerns when it comes 
to setting legal rules because of the possibility of a tax solution does little 
more than make tax the deus ex machina solution to distribution and 
property. It sounds nice in theory but breaks down in politics.205 Professors 
                                                                                                                          
201 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income 
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) (developing the argument that 
“redistribution through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax 
system”); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of 
Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 821–22 (2000) 
(addressing qualifications to the argument that legal rules should not be readjusted to redistribute 
income); see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
993 (2001) (“[M]any legal rules probably have little effect on the distribution of income.”). 
202 Zachary Liscow, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should 
Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2480–82 (2014); see also Daphna 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326, 327 
(2006) (similarly deconstructing and critiquing Kaplow and Shavell’s argument).   
203 Liscow, supra note 202, at 2482; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Trade-off Between Growth 
and Equity, in 1 KENNETH J. ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: SOCIAL CHOICE 
AND JUSTICE 190, 196–98 (1983) (detailing the range of costs associated with tax and transfer based 
redistribution); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1677 (1998) (“[T]he question whether redistributive legal rules or taxes cause 
greater distortion in work incentives is ultimately an empirical one and cannot be definitively resolved 
by the sort of analytic argument offered in the existing law and economics literature . . . .”). 
204 Liscow, supra note 202, at 2501.   
205 In politics, redistribution to the poor remains politically contentious. Trends, though, seem to 
be away from redistribution. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND 
CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 3 (1st ed. 2005) (describing the movement to 
lessen estate taxes despite such taxes’ only being collected from the wealthiest estates); JOEL F. 
HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 3 (1995) (discussing the anti-poor political 
environment that led to welfare reform); CHARLES LEWIS & BILL ALLISON, THE CHEATING OF 
AMERICA: HOW TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION BY THE SUPER RICH ARE COSTING THE COUNTRY 
BILLIONS—AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 6 (2002) (describing the tax evasion methods of 
wealthy individuals and corporations, as well as the country’s permissive approach to such practices). 
Moreover, redistribution through legal rules may, in some circumstances, be less politically costly than 
accomplishing the same through taxes and transfers. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, 
Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction 5 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 704, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2504819 [http://perma.cc/BE6N-
4S59].  
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Lee Fennell and Richard McAdams argue convincingly that “[a]ttention to 
the reality of political action costs should mark an end to categorical, 
empirically unsupported advice against pursuing distributive objectives 
outside of the tax system.”206 As Lascow writes, “if transfers are 
unavailable in practice, their theoretical availability is irrelevant; as a 
result, the legal rule should adopt the second-best policy of taking equity 
directly into account.”207 Suggesting otherwise may be intellectually 
satisfying but it requires considerable distance from the limited American 
political appetite for taxation and redistribution.   
Rather than avoiding moralizing about property, progressive property 
scholars embrace the connection between the law as it is and the law as it 
could be. They answer the broad question on whether to work with 
property to achieve progressive goals affirmatively. Although it is tempting 
for skeptics, including myself, to see this as a case of property scholars 
seeing nails all around, progressive scholars have offered new 
interpretations of existing doctrine and traditions in property law as a way 
of creating space for property law to better serve human values. Having 
previously written a summary and partial critique of progressive property, 
in this Article I am not going to present in detail Alexander’s social-
obligation norm theory, Peñalver’s virtue ethics approach, or Singer’s 
democratic model.208 Instead, my goal here is to suggest some reasons to 
question the “work with” answer in light of property law’s tendency to 
resist change.209 To further explore the “work with” stance towards 
property, this next sub-Part considers a recent “property”-based argument 
about how the law should respond to injustice and inequality: David 
Super’s attempt to bring The New Property to bear directly on issues of 
poverty and inequality in the wake of the Great Recession.210 Super’s A 
New New Property illustrates both the power of property and the risk that 
channeling progressive visions through a property-law framework will 
limit them.      
In A New New Property, Super argues that property law needs to be 
expanded to secure the community and family rights of the poor in ways 
that mirror the protection currently enjoyed by the wealthy. As the article’s 
title suggests, Super’s proposal serves in many ways as an update and an 
                                                                                                                          
206 Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics 5 
(Sept. 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 420 (1981). 
207 Liscow, supra note 202, at 2508.   
208 For a detailed review of these contributions, see Rosser, supra note 44, at 116–23.   
209 For a strong counter-argument “express[ing] slightly more confidence in property’s 
progressive bona fides,” see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive Property Moving Forward, 5 CALIF. 
L. REV. CIRCUIT 349, 358 (2014), http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ 
MULVANEY_349.pdf [http://perma.cc/2R9S-966P].   
210 See Super, supra note 24, at 1781–82.  
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effort to reanimate aspects of Reich’s The New Property. Super shows that 
while the legal response to The New Property was largely confined to a 
layer of procedural protections for the poor, Reich originally was skeptical 
that procedural rules alone would be enough to protect individuals, 
particularly the poor, from the state.211 Super observes that “the dramatic 
growth of inequality” in the fifty years that passed since the publication of 
The New Property, was something Reich could not have fully 
anticipated.212 Accordingly, A New New Property tackles the implications 
of this rise in inequality on the role of property in society, or as Super 
explains, “[w]hereas Reich’s primary focus was the subjugation 
individuals face without property rights, this Article’s concern is the 
consequences of extending property law’s protection to one segment of the 
population but not another. . . . [T]his Article is concerned primarily with 
property’s role in stratifying society.”213 Despite the difference in focus, 
the prescription offered by Super is the same as that offered by Reich half a 
century before: extend property protections to the poor.   
The basic problem that Super identifies with property law’s role in 
society today is that it operates almost solely for the benefit of the 
privileged.214 Super writes, “[o]ur nation is, again, a house divided, with 
one segment of the population enjoying the freedom that property rights 
bring and the other lacking those protections.”215 Super establishes this 
claim through a two-part argument. First, Super presents the widening gulf 
since the 1970s between low-income people and the rich.216 As is 
appropriate in a property article, Super emphasizes wealth disparities, 
showing not only a racial component, but also how such disparities 
negatively impact low-income people in everything from life choices to 
political power.217 Second, Super extensively discusses four important 
aspects of the lives of low-income people and their communities that lack 
protection and could be extended such protection through the application, 
directly or by analogy, of established property law concepts. Super uses 
such examples as: the right of family integrity in the case of immigrants; 
the protection of low-income communities from displacement; the work 
that equity could do on behalf of the poor in the mortgage foreclosure 
crisis; and the applicability of the Takings Clause to government support 
                                                                                                                          
211 Id. at 1780, 1785.   
212 Id. at 1781.   
213 Id. 
214 See id. at 1782 (discussing how the nation operates more favorably to the wealthy). 
215 Id.  
216 See id. at 178698 (exploring the disparities in property ownership, including the racial 
dimension to the disparities, the social impacts resulting from the disparities, the importance that 
property ownership adds to the heath of democracy, and, finally, the difficulty in implementing public 
policies to reduce wealth inequality). 
217 Id.   
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for the poor. By the end of the article, it is clear both that, because of 
inequality, the country is in a precarious position and that the lives of low-
income people are unnecessarily vulnerable, especially in contrast with the 
security enjoyed by the wealthy.   
Property is arguably an odd choice of mechanism for the protection of 
low-income people given the extent of its shortcomings, as Super notes. As 
a leading poverty law expert, Super is perhaps uniquely situated to see the 
limitations of property doctrines.218  Emphasizing that these limitations are 
not just applicable to those below the poverty line, A New New Property 
consistently refers to the affected population as “low-income people,” not 
as poor people.219 This choice is not merely stylistic, as it not only prevents 
the article from being drawn into the perennial battles over how poverty is 
defined,220 but also highlights the connections between the poor, near poor, 
and lower-middle class. Although I have adopted the shorthand, “poor,” in 
this Article, as opposed to the preference for “low-income,” Super draws a 
larger circle of concern, avoiding the negative connotations that often 
attach to the poor.221 Super successfully drums home two related, but not 
synonymous, points about property and low-income people. First, that 
courts and policymakers are “disposed to protect the property interests of 
the more affluent over those of low-income people despite the latter’s 
greater dependence on that property.”222 And second, “that the law values 
the kinds of interests affluent people typically have far more than those 
upon which lower-income people depend.”223 These two points raise 
related but not identical issues. If the problem is the first, that the property 
interests of the poor are not adequately protected, then the solution is 
straightforward: protect those interests. If the problem is the second, 
however, to protect lower-income people’s interests as property, they first 
have to be redefined as property. The first is the stuff of conventional 
property law scholarship—indeed, in many respects it could be treated as a 
                                                                                                                          
218 For example, in an earlier article, he brought to light the hurdles that poor people face when 
they try to raise an implied warranty of habitability defense in the context of an eviction for non-
payment of rent. David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. 
L. REV. 389, 405–13 (2011) [hereinafter Super, The Rise and Fall of the IWH]. Super’s poverty law 
work is wide-ranging but focuses on privatization and the state of the welfare system following welfare 
reform. See, e.g., David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the 
Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008); David A. Super, Privatization, Policy 
Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393 (2008); David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” 
Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1271 (2004).       
219 Super, supra note 24, at 1785, 1798, 1818.  
220 For a brief overview of alternative ways to measure poverty, see JULIET BRODIE ET AL., 
POVERTY LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 1–24 (2014).  
221 See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY 
AND INEQUALITY 150–85 (2007) (giving a history of the demonization of poor single mothers).  
222 Super, supra note 24, at 1871. 
223 Id. at 1798.   
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way of understanding progressive property scholarship in general. But the 
second point is more akin to Reich’s pioneering discussion of new 
property, and it is here that Super pushes the line on what counts as 
property.   
Standard fare among property law scholars consists of a fairly lean diet 
of equitable servitudes, the numerus clausus principle, and similar 
doctrine-heavy material that litter the property law canon. Reich, by 
sewing together everything from the bar requirements for practicing law 
and broadcast privileges, to welfare and military contracts, showed the 
insight that could be gleaned by taking a broad perspective on what fits 
within the property category.224 Super, in his first two examples continues 
where Reich left off. It is not that property scholars have not written about 
immigrant families, or social capital and poor communities,225 but these 
examinations tend to discuss how traditional property topics intersect with 
those groups, and do not, for example, argue that immigration law should 
be understood in terms of a property right for families to remain intact.  
Although the reasoning is tautological, precisely because these interests—
that of an immigrant family in remaining intact or that of a low-income 
community in not being displaced—are not thought of as property, it is 
hard to think of these interests as property. Super’s discussions of equity 
and mortgages and of expanding the Takings Clause to protect low-income 
people are a bit more conventional, but even there his proposals fall on the 
radical side of property scholarship (though they likely will be more 
quickly accepted among poverty scholars). In discussing what counts as 
property, my goal is not to critique Super for employing a wide 
perspective. But the need to have such a broad understanding raises once 
more the question: why property?   
Though A New New Property comes down on the side of supporting, 
not undermining, property, Super is quite critical of property law. In a 
passage worth quoting at length, Super highlights all that is wrong about 
property: 
Although . . . creative destruction still exists in economic 
life—with particular businesses failing when they cease to be 
efficient—much less of it remains in the body of property 
law itself. Modern property law has lost much of the vitality 
that long kept it at the center of Anglo-American law. 
Property has overwhelmingly become the law of stability, a 
drag on change in other areas. And as social and economic 
                                                                                                                          
224 See Reich, supra note 22, at 73437 (examining categories of government-created wealth).  
225 See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in 
Residential Property Law, 99 VA. L. REV. 811 (2013); Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without 
Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen Property Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2013).   
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change has driven demands for legal change, all too often the 
legal system has not adapted property law but merely shoved 
it out of the way. The mustiest, stodgiest aspects of property 
law have come to dominate the field. Innovation is confined 
to a few relatively insular areas such as intellectual 
property.226  
This passage from the article’s introduction expresses eloquently my 
views and frustrations surrounding property.227 Taking a more optimistic 
view of property, however, A New New Property ends by arguing that it 
would be a mistake to lose faith in property. Super notes, “[t]he legal 
concept of property has been at the heart of some of the most shameful 
episodes in U.S. history. Those hoping for a brighter future could be 
forgiven for wanting to dispense with property as a system of 
individualistic trumps against the will of the state.”228 But Super goes on to 
say that just as the civil rights movement made use of constitutional law 
despite its “speckled history,” so to “the troubling aspects of property law’s 
history should not prevent legal scholars from seeing its potential to protect 
vulnerable people’s most important relationships.”229   
But are there no other options; either latch on to property law 
protections, albeit expanded versions of them, or be an unrealistic utopian 
who fails to see the potential that lurks below the troubled history? Super 
observes that the “disparities in property rights between the rich and poor” 
can be addressed through redistributive transfers, which he—correctly—
rejects as politically infeasible or by expanding property to recognize 
additional property right forms.230 I agree with both the idea that the rise in 
inequality presents a tremendous challenge for property law and the related 
observation that “[a]s long as property law single-mindedly emphasizes 
stability in a dynamic world, it will become increasingly marginalized.”231  
Where I part company with Super is in the notion that there are only two 
options, and that those concerned about low-income people must therefore 
seek to strengthen property. A third possibility is to weaken property 
                                                                                                                          
226 Super, supra note 24, at 1776 (emphasis added).  
227 See Rosser, supra note 44, at 141–42 (critiquing property scholars’ treatment of intellectual 
property as a realm of innovation while being fairly conservative when it comes to considering radical 
changes related to distribution of real property). 
228 Super, supra note 24, at 1878; see also Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and 
Why Formal Private Property Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2030–31 (2012) 
(arguing that formalizing property rights can make owners more vulnerable to the state); Edward L. 
Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a Right and Its Reality as an Imperfect Alternative, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 573, 604 (describing the concept of property as a trump against the state as “a difficult argument 
to take seriously” because “we are a long way past the time . . . when only property holders had liberty 
rights”). 
229 Super, supra note 24, at 1878.   
230 Id. at 1782–83; see also supra text accompanying notes 205–07. 
231 Super, supra note 24, at 1776.   
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protections for the rich or, at least, to condition the existing high level of 
protection given the rich232 on expanding property protections, to reach 
low-income people in ways they do not currently. There are points in A 
New New Property that open the possibility for selectively weakening 
property rights. For example, Super briefly acknowledges that, in some 
contexts it might be appropriate to increase the property rights of the poor 
and simultaneously deny those same rights to the non-poor:   
Thus, instead of sardonically noting that “the majestic 
equality of the laws . . . forbid[s] [the] rich and poor alike to 
sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal . . . 
bread,” this more nuanced vision would protect a homeless 
person’s right to sleep outdoors while finding no 
corresponding right for an owner of a conventional home to 
sleep in public places.233 
This acknowledgment is followed later in the article by an entire 
section on reviving equity as a way to create space for selective 
enforcement of the law.234 Although Super does not frame it as such, by 
arguing that equity should protect borrowers facing foreclosure, he is also 
arguing to weaken the property rights of lenders. From the perspective of 
lenders whose rights would be trampled through Super’s revival of equity, 
that equity does not abrogate “the underlying legal rule . . . it is simply 
denied effect in a particular case,” providing little comfort.235 But the 
overall push of A New New Property is to bring the property rights of low-
income people up to the level enjoyed by the wealthy, not the inverse, to 
push the protections enjoyed by the privileged down.   
Some readers of this Article, and of A New New Property, I suspect 
will reject the very idea that property right protections depend on one’s 
class position. The claim though that property law is neutral, something 
that can be taken up by anyone and therefore is not subject to class 
analysis, strips our understanding of property from its context in terms of 
the inequitable benefit it gives those with higher incomes.236 I raised the 
possibility of weakening property rights briefly in my last article,237 but it 
remains unclear to me why the property protections that the wealthy 
                                                                                                                          
232 See Fennell, supra note 95, at 1488 (noting the societally incurred costs of “defining and 
enforcing property entitlements”).   
233 Super, supra note 24, at 1784.  
234 Id. at 1840–68.   
235 Id. at 1851. 
236 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (advocating “[l]ooking to the bottom—adopting the 
perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise” to better understand the 
law and find solutions to societal problems).   
237 See Rosser, supra note 44, at 148–49 (exploring the possibility of diminishing the advantages 
often associated with traditional property).   
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disproportionately enjoy are held sacrosanct, even by those driven to 
advocate for the poor. Perhaps my favorite quote in A New New Property is 
one Super credits to his clinic supervisor when he was a law student: 
“Nothing gets people where they live like getting them where they live.”238 
It is a brilliant insight, and one that suggests a more radical approach to 
property law when coupled with Super’s observation that “the last four 
decades have shown that substantial new antipoverty programs are not 
enacted, except as the result of major political upheavals.”239 This echoes 
the oft-repeated observation among progressive scholars that significant 
changes to improve the lives of the poor or of minority populations come 
about rarely and only as a result of tremendous push or circumstances that 
create a crisis. Property does provide real benefits to people who have 
access to it and whose interests are defined as property. This perhaps 
explains Super’s hope of ratcheting up the property rights of low-income 
people, so that their interests are protected in ways akin to the protections 
afforded higher-income people. But getting there may require selectively 
reversing the direction of the ratchet on the force of existing property 
protections. Ratcheting downward can either equalize downward or 
generate a crisis, such that low-income people find the support largely 
denied them in the ordinary course of politics.    
Perhaps it is unfair to critique the idea of trying to incorporate 
vulnerable peoples into property law rather than challenging the law. But 
underlying the belief that the system needs some reform while keeping the 
basic structure intact is the idea that overall the law works. The response 
accordingly is to suggest modifications to the law, not more radical 
departures from it. This perspective could be characterized negatively as 
that of the propertied or those who expect in the future to benefit from the 
structure. But a more fair characterization is to describe it as the 
perspective of those who see value in extending the structure.240 It is a 
perspective that discounts the possibility that, for many people, property 
might be primarily a constraint, rather than a way of protecting their 
interests.   
Can property law be otherwise? Laura Underkuffler writes, “[p]roperty 
is, by definition, the protection of the status quo; it cannot, of itself, answer 
the question of when there is a justified change in that status quo.”241  
                                                                                                                          
238 Super, supra note 24, at 1840 n.439 (crediting Marilyn Mullane, a former executive director of 
Michigan Legal Services, with the quote).  
239 Id. at 1875 (emphasis added).  
240 As Zachary Bray explains, “the new progressive property is at least partially descriptive 
insofar as it contends that American property law, at times, already recognizes the goals it endorses.”  
Zachary Bray, The New Progressive Property and the Low-Income Housing Conflict, 2012 BYU L. 
REV. 1109, 1113.    
241 Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Conundrum, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
2015, 2034–35 (2013) (emphasis in original); see also VAN DER WALT, supra note 13, at 215–21.  
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Underkuffler’s idea, that property “has no meaning apart from the idea of 
protection,”242 is an idea shared by other scholars who emphasize how 
property is different from other rights because the right itself is not to 
something independently valued, such as free speech, but is instead a right 
to claim rights.243  Underkuffler explains: 
Property, as an idea, is the establishment of entitle-
ments. . . . It is the recognition, and protection, of the 
individual’s rights in land; or rights in chattels; or rights in 
any identified source of wealth. It is a right to the 
continuation of the legal status quo. It has no other meaning. 
As a result, property’s meaning—as an abstract 
constitutional right—is threatened, profoundly, by the reality 
of change, the inevitably of change, and the recognition of 
the often-justified claims of competing public interests.244 
If Underkuffler is right, and property has no other meaning outside of 
protection of the status quo, then one can imagine two different roles for 
the property law scholar. First, a scholar might embrace property law and 
see his or her purpose as supporting property law, in the process providing 
intellectual support for the status quo. Or, second, a scholar might see his 
or her role differently, as being primarily concerned with change and be 
open to deliberately threatening status quo’s vassal, property law.  
Progressive property scholarship does not fit this dichotomy in that it 
attempts to show how inclusionary theories can fit strains of property 
law.245 As such, progressive scholarship is oddly situated in that it is both 
opposed to the status quo, while generally supportive of the overall 
structure of property law (and property doctrine). If, however, these two 
positions are not compatible, perhaps more can be accomplished by those 
seeking inclusion through active resistance to the property framework.   
IV.  APPLYING PRESSURE 
If one looks at property not from the perspective of those who have 
property, but from the perspective of those who are excluded and have 
little chance of meaningful inclusion in the present system, the existing law 
loses its luster.246 From such a vantage point, property law is less of a 
means of protection against the state as much as it is a means of oppression 
                                                                                                                          
242 Underkuffler, supra note 241, at 2030 (emphasis in original).   
243 See, e.g., Dorfman, supra note 43. 
244 Underkuffler, supra note 241, at 2016.  
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sanctioned by the state and disproportionately enjoyed by the few.247 As 
Professor Eric Freyfogle notes, “private property empowers some people to 
harm, dominate or otherwise control other people—even if only by 
insisting that they stay away.”248 To correct for such power when taken too 
far may require pragmatic destabilization of property law. Breaking down 
the class and caste system in the United States may require pragmatically 
undermining the security provided through property. Working against 
property, rather than for or with property, is only radical in that it strikes 
against the reification of property rights in our society.   
Property rights are not ends in themselves and, accordingly, the level 
of protection afforded property owners can, and should, be adjusted as 
society changes.249 Hidden in the back-and-forth between conservatives 
and progressives on the nature of property and the significance of rules 
versus exceptions is the idea—championed by scholars of law and 
economics for whom “the legal system [is] . . . up for grabs”—that 
property rights are “malleable.”250 Emphasizing the idea that property 
rights can change opens up the possibility of creating space to work against 
the status quo—against traditional property law. While the position that 
those concerned about poverty and inequality ought to leave property law 
alone because tax-and-transfer programs are more efficient is attractive as 
a theoretical matter, in practice such a position does little to respond to the 
challenges of poverty and inequality.251 The United States is an outlier, in 
the negative sense, compared to other developed countries when it comes 
to using tax-and-transfer programs to lift people, including children, out of 
poverty.252 Their security provided through property, the privileged can 
remain indifferent or, worse, antagonistic towards low-income people.  
Property scholars and property law should not remain on the sidelines as 
the country continues down the path towards a rigid, largely non-porous, 
class system.253 Indeed, as a pragmatic matter, lessening or threatening to 
                                                                                                                          
247 For the classic theoretical statement of this difference in perspective, see Hohfeld, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions 1917, supra note 37 (distinguishing between a right in personam as 
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lessen the extent to which property rights are protected may be a uniquely 
effective response.   
Applying pressure to the existing structure may require destabilizing 
property. Charles Sabel and William Simon explain, “[d]estabilization 
rights are claims to unsettle and open up public institutions that have 
chronically failed to meet their obligations and that are substantially 
insulated from the normal processes of political accountability.”254  
Property law, especially as it serves to protect a status quo marked by 
inequality and inequity, I would argue, is this sort of institution. Whether 
more explicitly, in the case of information cost theory, or more subtly, in 
the case of progressive property scholarship, the status quo has a hold on 
property law and may even define it. Moreover, as an institution that is 
thought of as being somehow apart from politics and made up of 
complicated background rules, it is fairly insulated from correction through 
the political process even though it serves to protect the interest of an 
increasingly small and self-perpetuating ownership class to the detriment 
of the excluded. Destabilization may be the best path forward. Sabel and 
Simon explain, “[d]estabilization induces the institution to reform itself in 
a process in which it must respond to previously excluded stakeholders.”255   
Roberto Mangabeira Unger first developed the idea of “destabilization 
rights” in his 1987 work, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social 
Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy.256 Unger advocated breaking 
apart traditional property rights and reallocating portions of those rights 
across government bodies and economic actors.257 Such a proposal could 
be interpreted as merely an aggressive embrace of ripping apart the bundle 
of sticks. As the author of one of the definitive texts on Critical Legal 
Studies,258 Unger might predictably be inclined to draw upon New 
Realism’s skepticism regarding absolute and traditional notions of 
property. Destabilization rights according to this construction of Unger’s 
attack on traditional property serve to tear property down but do little to 
build up an alternative role for property.  
If destabilizing property is nothing more than pulling out individual 
sticks from the bundle, then, arguably, a cautious approach to the idea is 
called for in light of both the concerns of information theorists and recent 
events. As a brief reminder, Smith and Merrill fault the bundle-of-rights 
conception of property because it suggests that the bundle can be torn apart 
                                                                                                                          
254 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
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at will, which they claim misses the interdependent nature of many of the 
sticks and fails to recognize the centrality of exclusion. The collapse of the 
housing market and financial crisis of 2007–2008 arguably attest to the 
problems with the bundle conception identified by Smith and Merrill.  
Examples of moving from absolute property rights to more disaggregated 
forms of property can be seen in collateralized debt obligations and similar 
novel forms of property that pushed the housing market over a cliff.  
Professor Heather Hughes argues that the crisis shows that to protect third 
parties, numerus clausus principles arguably should guide limits placed on 
the forms financial products can take.259 Others have gone further, blaming 
fragmentation for the crisis and advocating a “closed set of forms” based 
on the numerus clausus principle as a way to stabilize markets.260 The 
apparent association between disaggregation and collapse is also 
highlighted in a recent scholarly critique.261 Cristie Ford and Carol Liao 
write, “[r]ecent events suggest that, somewhat contrary to Unger, power 
relationships will reassert themselves in malleable social and economic 
space, such as that created by a breakdown in traditional property rights. 
The absence of formal ownership rights will make people more, not less, 
vulnerable to nontransparent exercises of power.”262 Even though Ford and 
Liao note that “[d]estabilization rights continue to play an essential, and 
instinctively attractive, role in responding to the anti-democratic 
entrenchment of powerful interests,”263 they see the proliferation of 
property forms leading up to the Great Recession as a reason to stick with 
traditional property.264 Ford and Liao’s view is that destabilizing property 
ends up harming the vulnerable because “the disaggregation of property 
seems to exacerbate inequality and allow for greater power to amass 
among the already powerful.”265   
The anti-bundle interpretation of Unger’s destabilization rights, 
                                                                                                                          
259 Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and Private Law, 20 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 33–37). 
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however, is unfairly narrow. It contains elements of truth,266 but Unger’s 
original idea of destabilization rights was as much about orientation as it 
was about property forms. Unger argued destabilization is required 
precisely in order to prevent the powerful from capturing the legal 
apparatus.267 Destabilization rights “serve not to embody specific ideals of 
human association but to ensure that, whatever the enacted forms of human 
association may be, they will preserve certain minimal qualities: above all, 
the quality of being readily replaceable.”268 False Necessity lays out a 
vision for an alternative economic and political order, albeit a vision that 
Unger later acknowledged was largely ignored.269 But the vision was more 
a response to power relationships than a detailed set of plans. Put 
differently, disaggregation of property rights was just the mechanism 
Unger saw as a way to implement his large vision. Destabilization rights 
were one part of Unger’s vision and they operate alongside with what 
Unger calls “immunity rights”—basic individual rights and protections.270  
Unger’s vision is therefore built around providing a basic level of security 
and independence while also providing a mechanism to “break[] open . . . 
insulated hierarchies of power and advantage.”271 In contrast with this 
vision, property currently operates to preserve the status quo, preventing 
effective challenges to hierarchical advantages and granting property 
holders a great deal of independence and protection, but not making such 
protection universal. Rejecting the notion of rights as rights to be free from 
the state (in property, the castle model of ownership), Unger argues that 
“[t]he point of destabilization rights is . . . to prevent recurrent, 
institutionalized relationships among groups from falling into certain 
prohibited routines of closure and subjugation.”272   
If orientation is understood as being more important than form when it 
comes to destabilization rights, one can think about ways of destabilizing 
property that do not rely upon further disaggregating it. As critics of the 
bundle are all too aware, even with the numerus clausus principle, property 
can already be disaggregated, separated, and recombined in many ways.273  
Unless property is understood in its most general sense as protection of the 
status quo, it is hard to talk about property as being inherently conservative 
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or progressive. Limited equity co-ops exist alongside the fee simple,274 the 
right to exclude is paired with cases limiting that right,275 doctrines such as 
the implied warranty of habitability coexist with the American rule on 
delivery of possession.276 The variety of possible forms property can 
theoretically take does not, however, undermine the need to destabilize 
property where property operates along a narrower range in practice. To 
use a bad analogy, the fact that McDonald’s offers healthy options—milk, 
salad, fruit—does not make McDonald’s a healthy option. Even though 
progressive scholars are right to point out the existence of beach access 
rules and the social aspects of ownership, the burgers and fries of property 
law continue to be fee simple absolute and the right to exclude.277 Since 
property law already allows for many forms of disaggregation, offering a 
proliferation of such forms by itself will not destabilize the institution. 
Instead, because of property law’s social and legal context, destabilization 
involves seeking to undermine the role property protections play in our 
society. In what follows, Part IV shows how property law can be 
destabilized in two ways: through the selective use of existing law or 
through pragmatic resistance to entrenched inequality. The goal of this Part 
is not to make the definitive case for an against property strategy. Given 
where the debates are taking place today, between conservatives who 
largely work for property and progressives who work with property, it is 
enough if this Part shows that destabilization should be included among the 
alternative approaches considered for how the law can and should respond 
to the challenges of poverty and inequality in the New Gilded Age.  
A. Selective Use of Doctrine 
In 1966, Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward argued for a mass 
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enrollment effort in public benefits in order to overwhelm the welfare 
system.278 Piven and Cloward observed that only about half of those 
eligible were receiving welfare and their hope was that an enrollment 
campaign would force nationalization and expansion of welfare benefits.279 
The strategy was designed to “precipitate a profound financial and political 
crisis” and “produce bureaucratic disruption in welfare agencies and fiscal 
disruption in local and state governments.”280 By generating a crisis, which 
Piven and Cloward defined as “a publicly visible disruption in some 
institutional sphere,” welfare rights advocates and recipients could pressure 
politicians in Washington to support the right to a basic income for poor 
people.281 Of course, in hindsight the record is mixed on Piven and 
Cloward’s mobilization strategy. In the short-term, arguably lasting a full 
generation, increasing numbers of eligible individuals and families got 
access to needed benefits. But the longer-term record is more problematic. 
Thirty years after The Nation published Piven and Cloward’s advocacy 
piece, President Clinton, a Democrat, signed welfare reform into law.282 
The expansion in enrollment, coupled with racist notions of recipients and 
changing expectations regarding mother’s obligations, generated a crisis 
after all, but one marked by popular backlash against welfare.283 As Piven 
and Cloward recognized at the time, “[n]o strategy, however confident its 
advocates may be, is foolproof.”284 
Lots of lessons have been drawn from Piven and Cloward’s strategy, 
but one important component of the strategy was that the crisis came out of 
the law itself. A crisis could be created using the existing eligibility 
categories, leveraging the “vast discrepancy . . . between the benefits to 
which people are entitled under public welfare programs and the sums 
which they actually receive.”285 The tools necessary to generate the crisis 
were available through existing law; the trick was to call upon and make 
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full use of the law, not to change it.286 To return to Unger’s formulation of 
destabilization rights, Piven and Cloward recognized that destabilization of 
the status quo could occur through selective use of the law.287 In partial 
contrast with Unger’s elaborate redrawing of property forms, the 
mobilization strategy drew upon existing categories to expand the class of 
rights claimants. 
This sub-Part of the Article looks at how existing features of property 
law doctrine can be used to destabilize property holdings. Since property 
forms already permit a great degree of variation on how property is held, 
the focus is on weakening property protections to support a more inclusive 
society, not on adding to the list of ways property can be held. I explore 
two examples of using the law to destabilize settled property law 
expectations. First, this sub-Part shows how the law helps create and 
protect an inclusionary version of the market, in part by blocking 
monopolistic holdings of property. Second, it presents ways the law can be 
used to increase the power of vulnerable populations. As was true of Piven 
and Cloward’s attempt to precipitate a welfare crisis, in each of these cases 
the record is mixed, but they also illustrate the potential power of using 
existing doctrine to destabilize property.  
1. Democratizing the Market 
While it is fairly easy to find property law doctrines that seem to 
confirm or at least be based upon John Locke’s justification for private 
property, the same cannot be said with regard to Locke’s proviso. Locke 
famously argued that “[w]hatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that 
nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and 
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property.”288 And whether looking at original land claims in a wilderness, 
adverse possession, or intellectual property rights to newly created items or 
ideas, societal recognition of ownership seems to parallel Locke’s 
argument. But Locke also limited his claim to an “unquestionable” right to 
property to cases “where there is enough, and as good left in common for 
                                                                                                                          
286 Outside of the property context, the same strategy underlies the “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot” 
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others.”289 While it can be hard to come up with examples of the law 
operating perfectly in line with Locke’s proviso, many market shaping 
rules reflect an overarching concern with the effects of a concentration of 
property holdings on society. Although property law often emphasizes the 
importance of protecting individuals from both the state and from the 
larger society, limitations on ownership help ensure that the economy is 
not monopolized by powerful interests and, at times, limitations even 
deliberately work towards democratizing markets. 
Antitrust and anti-monopoly laws designed to protect the market—and 
consumers—from monopoly firms are largely taken for granted today, 
even though they do some violence to laissez-faire ideas regarding private 
property and the role of the state.290 It is treated as a matter of course that 
the merger of large companies should be subject to government review. 
Similarly, when it comes to essential products that rely upon economies of 
scale and that face few competitors, the government plays a significant role 
in defining everything from level of service to price.291 What is perhaps 
most remarkable about antitrust law and heavily regulated industry is how 
unremarkable it all seems. Such limits become background rules rather 
than sites of contention. That is not to say that they should always be 
immune from politics. The trust-busting of the Progressive Era under 
President Theodore Roosevelt helped bring the Gilded Age to heel. The 
government has been comparatively weak when it comes to checking the 
power of the New Gilded Age’s “too big to fail” companies, banks, and 
hedge funds.292 But the larger point is that when it comes to concentrated 
holdings that threaten competition or that could otherwise dominate 
markets, the government’s responsibility to protect against these evils of 
amassed holdings of property and power is generally accepted. 
Similar concerns, arguably in line with Locke’s proviso, lie behind 
limits on how owners and investors can develop real property. Instead of 
Blackstone’s “sole and despotic dominion,”293 owners and developers 
confront an array of zoning restrictions and permitting requirements. As 
numerous scholars have shown, the effect of these processes is often 
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exclusionary.294 But zoning also can protect against monopolization of 
space by elites. Inclusionary Zoning, though typically viewed as merely a 
form of government extraction, can also be viewed as a way to make sure 
that attractive areas are not monopolized by the wealthy. The critique that 
inclusionary zoning is not efficient295 does not address this separate value 
of inclusionary zoning. Is inclusionary zoning destabilizing?296 From the 
perspective of an owner accustomed to being able to do whatever he or she 
wants with the property, it is incredibly destabilizing.297 But once inclusion 
becomes a standard part of development, investor expectations take into 
account the inclusionary requirement.298 When a developer seeks to 
convert a large farm into palatial homes, inclusionary zoning can prevent 
the entire area from being turned into McMansions.299 Inclusionary units 
are not the same as the mythical commons, but a claim can be made that 
the right of McMansion owners to their property is stronger because of the 
existence of the inclusionary units. After all, inclusionary units reflect to 
some extent the idea that property claims are strongest “where there is 
enough, and as good left in common for others.”300  
Homesteading and developer remedies provide two complicated 
examples of how property law can protect against monopolies and 
democratize the market. Complicated only insofar as the settlement of the 
Midwest relied upon dispossessing Indians, homesteading rules sharply 
limited the size of individual claims. The U.S. government could have sold 
off the frontier to the highest bidder, but instead it helped create a robust 
and deep system of family farming.301 This commitment to the ideal of the 
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yeoman farmer has not always led to the best policies,302 but in the 
homesteading example it served as a hedge against property becoming 
overly concentrated in the hands of industrial employers and land 
barons.303 Conceptually more complicated, the developer remedies that 
arose out of challenges to local exclusionary practices in New Jersey also 
create access and democratize markets. Depending on perspective, 
developer remedies either expand the rights of property owners or limit 
them. Created in response to the Mount Laurel decision,304 which required 
suburbs not to foreclose the possibility of moderate and low-income 
housing, developer remedies provide a path through permitting processes 
where the development includes affordable housing.305 For developers 
stymied by local red tape, the remedy amounts to an expansion of their 
rights as owners of the land to be developed. But for neighbors who had 
long used their property interests in the community as a not-in-my-
backyard shield against undesirable developments and newcomers, the 
developer remedy lessens the de facto exclusionary power that previously 
was associated with homeownership. Similarly, rights to place mobile 
homes or to build accessory dwelling units can lessen the rights of 
neighbors even as they increase the development rights associated with 
ownership of particular parcels. In all these cases, such development rights, 
to the extent that they bypass cumbersome local processes and permit the 
construction of more affordable housing, positively destabilize property-
                                                                                                                          
Gifford Pinchot used this same rhetoric to justify getting the federal government involved in 
conservation, particularly in the business of building dams and big irrigation works to open-up new 
lands for families to settle.”). 
302 See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the 
impact of allotment on Indian tribes). 
303 See Note, Distributive Liberty: A Relational Model of Freedom, Coercion, and Property Law, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 859, 871 (1994) (“Most of the restraints on accumulation, alienation, and use that 
the Reformers proposed can be understood as attempts to counteract the withholding capacity of large 
landowners and to extend the staying power of settlers in order to make small freehold farming a viable 
alternative life plan.”). The relative ease of incorporating business entities in the United States provides 
a similar example of how the law can protect against undue concentrations of wealth. Where the right 
to incorporate is either extremely limited—as it was when corporate charters had to originate from the 
crown—or subjected to endless red tape, competition is either stifled or driven underground. But where 
incorporation is routine, is largely a given, and is not overly burdensome, the state preserves “enough” 
market participation rights. Though not within the traditional ambit of property law, fair and fast 
incorporation mechanisms can reduce the power of entrenched interests. Though in the United States 
the ability to assume the corporate form is taken for granted, the experience of other countries shows 
the nexus between property rights and Locke’s proviso when it comes to incorporation. See HERNANDO 
DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS 
EVERYWHERE ELSE 209–17 (2000) (discussing the difficulty of getting rights recognized in developing 
countries).  
304 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 716 (N.J. 1975). 
305 See DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1996) 
(giving a detailed history of the political and legal fight to build low-income housing in Mount Laurel, 
New Jersey). 
 452 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:397 
based expectations. 
It is one thing to create broad-based markets or distribute rights in a 
more egalitarian manner; it is another to take away advantages and 
holdings that are already enjoyed by a select few. Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff illustrates the extra complications associated with the 
latter.306 Midkiff involved an effort by the state of Hawaii to use its eminent 
domain authority to transfer land, involuntarily, from a private landowner 
to private lessees.307 Hawaii passed a land-reform act that provided for this 
transfer of land in order to, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
“reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligarchy.”308 In 
this case, the “land oligarchy” was land formerly held by the Hawaiian 
monarchy.309 Though the Midkiff Court’s holding that eminent domain can 
be used to transfer land from one private party to another if there is a 
legitimate public purpose foreshadowed the decision in Kelo v. New 
London,310 the holding was unanimous and straightforward.311 As the Court 
in Midkiff noted, “[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is 
a classic exercise of a State’s police powers.”312 The Court concluded by 
declaring that “to attack certain perceived evils of concentrated property 
ownership” is a legitimate use of state authority.313 
What this sub-Part shows is that when property law takes seriously 
Locke’s proviso, it can play a destabilizing role, acting as a check on the 
power of elites. The legal mechanism can take many forms: preventing 
monopolies from being established, ensuring that emerging markets or new 
resources are broadly distributed and accessible, and even using the law to 
take away rights from property owners where holdings are too 
concentrated.314 Seeing the destabilizing element in some of these 
examples is difficult because the relevant laws and principles have become 
sufficiently established that they move into the background. Yet, thinking 
about areas where these principles could be applied reveals the potential 
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destabilizing effects of a commitment to democratizing markets.315 The 
motivated state might do more to limit the power of concentrated wealth, 
as in the case of brick-and-mortar giants such as Wal-Mart at a national 
level and particular manufacturers at a local level, as well as new economy 
monopolists such as Amazon and Apple. Though demand to curb the 
power of firms such as Goldman or the Blackstone Group is limited largely 
to fringe protest movements,316 property law has the potential to be used as 
a tool to rein in powerful entities in order to shape an inclusive form of 
capitalism.   
2. Turning Representation into Power 
Given the inequities in access to lawyers, simply ensuring that the poor 
have legal representation can be destabilizing. This is especially the case 
when representation and advocacy are undertaken strategically. An 
ongoing debate among poverty lawyers involves whether or not legal aid 
offices should focus on individual representation (“access”) or on 
systematic change.317 The common ground in this debate, and the crucial 
point when it comes to destabilization, is that lawyers matter.318 And they 
can matter for whole groups of people, even where lawyers are forced to be 
selective in terms of which clients and what types of cases they take on.319 
The idea that lawyers matter is such a simple observation that it can be 
hard to see the destabilizing aspects of representation. After all, the job of a 
poverty lawyer is often simply to help in the assertion of rights, including 
property rights, and often does not involve the assertion of novel claims of 
right.320 Even where the anti-poverty lawyer pushes for an expansion in the 
protection of the poor, the claims generally are fairly straightforward; this 
would not be permitted if these people were not poor so it should not be 
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allowed. The police should not burst into welfare recipients’ homes late at 
night to search for an undeclared man in the house.321 An applicant for 
public assistance should not have to pay for a drug test as part of the 
application.322 A person should not lose his or her home because their 
grandchildren or caretaker uses drugs.323 The government should not take 
away support it provides for people’s basic needs without a hearing.324 
Children should not receive a substandard education just because of their 
race and where their parents live.325 People should not have to pay rent if 
the unit is not fit for human habitation.326 It is only in the context of a 
society as enamored with the linked ideas—that America is the land of 
opportunity and that the poor are largely undeserving—that such 
straightforward claims are seen as matters of law reform instead of self-
evident truths.   
Even where the claims are unlikely to reach the Supreme Court, simply 
affording representation to the poor can destabilize the property owners’ 
ordinary expectations. When the norm is that the poor do not have legal 
assistance, effective assertions of rights by the poor can diminish the 
property protections enjoyed by owners.327 For example, a tenant facing 
eviction fares much better when assisted by counsel.328 Not only does the 
legal services attorney in this example protect the rights of the tenant, but 
he or she also lessens the de facto power the owner has over the unit.329 
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One can imagine the transformative power of expanding the right to 
counsel for the indigent to civil cases.330 Though the goal of the “civil 
Gideon” movement is often framed in terms of individual rights, it is easy 
to see that such a right likely would have a structural impact on how 
property law operates in practice.331 In light of the blows the Supreme 
Court has dealt right-to-counsel claims and predictable underfunding of 
legal aid by Congress, however, a national flood-the-courts strategy 
belongs largely in the realm of the imagination.332 But the country’s lack of 
commitment to broadening the right to counsel for the indigent does not 
mean that property law cannot be destabilized through representation, only 
that doing so involves acting strategically.   
What this sub-Part shows is that targeted interventions in the ordinary 
workings of property law can be used to protect vulnerable populations by 
changing the power dynamics of the market. The interventions can take a 
number of forms and involve different actors, but the goal is to weaken the 
ability and power of owners to use property rights to their advantage. 
Three types of interventions through coordinated representation stand out: 
place-based, party-based, and claim-based.333 In the first, lawyers agree to 
focus their efforts on a geographically defined space.334 The goal is not 
necessarily to change the overarching laws affecting their clients, but to 
change the market dynamics operating within that space by rigorously 
advocating for people within the area.335 In the second, legal assistance is 
directed not to the poor in general but to particular parties who have shared 
characteristics.336 This strategy can be based on particular characteristics or 
needs of the poor, their employment, their legal status, their race, or their 
gender, and the strategy is designed to challenge how the law treats that 
issue. Again, the goal is not explicitly to change the law, only to change 
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how the law is enforced through a concentrated effort to ensure the poor 
get the full benefit of existing laws in a way that does not occur in the 
absence of legal assistance.337 In the third type of intervention, 
representation is not based on geography or the particulars of individual 
clients, but on the nature of the claims that can be brought. To some 
degree, of course, the third type incorporates elements of the previous two 
types, but the strategy can be distinguished because here the goal is to 
change the law.338 Commonly described as impact litigation, the hope is to 
find just the right client, just the right defendant, and a practice or law that 
calls for judicial correction rather than simply attempting to alter 
enforcement costs.339  
These strategies need not operate independently, though frequently 
they do because of the ways institutions are organized along lines that 
mirror these intervention types. Thus, lawyers working for or with a 
geographically-based community economic development (CED) 
organization are likely to adopt approaches that are defined by the area 
served by the organization.340 This silo effect can also be observed in 
party-based entities, such as those created and funded to be, for example, 
employment justice centers or immigration defense clinics. Similarly, the 
expertise and capacity of claim-based organizations—best exemplified 
perhaps by those trying to advance racial justice such as the NAACP, 
MALDEF, NARF, and AALDEF—are often focused on appellate 
advocacy in the hopes a single case will have a big impact.341 But whether 
operating independently or as part of a larger strategy, these three types of 
interventions can all destabilize how—in the absence of legal assistance—
property law ordinarily works against vulnerable or disadvantaged 
populations. This sub-Part focuses on ways selective use of the law, 
drawing upon one or more of these types of interventions, can help secure 
poor communities against market forces that would otherwise make their 
housing unaffordable. Similar forms of destabilization through targeted 
representation can be identified across many other areas of law—labor law, 
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POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 121 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) 
(describing this in terms of “a strategy of using every available procedural technicality and  
objection . . . transforming an extremely inexpensive and brief legal proceeding into a very costly and 
time-consuming one”).   
338 Feldman, supra note 333, at 1528.  
339 See id. at 1537–38 (distinguishing service and impact cases).  
340 See David J. Barron, The Community Economic Development Movement: A Metropolitan 
Perspective, 56 STAN. L. REV. 701, 720–25 (2003) (reviewing WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001)) 
(critiquing the CED movement for being too locally focused).  
341 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 472–77 (1976) (reviewing the NAACP’s litigation 
strategy to achieve desegregated school systems).  
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immigration law, family law, discrimination law, etc.—that are seen as 
separate from property law even though they have significant property 
implications. But a focus on communities and housing is both convenient 
and appropriate, drawing as it does upon examples solidly within the 
property law sphere. 
In practice, these interventions involve selective use of property law to 
protect the well-being of the poor by helping to secure communities 
against market forces. Through targeted and aggressive defense of tenants 
facing eviction, lawyers can fight against market forces that would 
otherwise operate to displace low-income people.342 Property law already 
provides tenants with a right to not have to live in terrible conditions 
through the implied warranty of habitability (IWH).343 In areas where 
claiming a violation of the IWH is not conditioned on paying rent into an 
escrow account, the IWH can be an effective defense against eviction for 
non-payment.344 Yet, the likelihood that tenants will raise eviction defenses 
effectively is closely linked to whether they have legal assistance.345 
Without knowledge of the IWH or legal assistance, the IWH can become 
merely a paper right that does little to slow down the eviction machine.346 
Targeted and aggressive representation, however, can “make the eviction 
process expensive and difficult for the landlord, thereby slowing 
gentrification and blocking displacement.”347 This is not a new idea; during 
the 1980s and 1990s, eviction free zones (EFZs) were pushed as a matter 
of practice and scholarship by Harvard Law School professors, students, 
and alumni.348 As a leading article on EFZs explained, “[t]he point of the 
strategy is to launch a form of legal guerilla warfare. . . . [T]he lawyer uses 
any legal means at hand to bring about the desired result of increasing the 
                                                                                                                          
342 See, e.g., Lazerson, supra note 337, at 128–35, 148–56, 160 (showing how aggressive use of 
legal formalism by legal aid attorneys can change the nature of evictions proceedings).  
343 For an overview of the development of the IWH, see Donald E. Campbell, Forty (Plus) Years 
After the Revolution: Observations on the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L. REV. 793, 795–809 (2013). 
344 But see Super, The Rise and Fall of the IWH, supra note 218, at 432–33 (explaining that in 
jurisdictions that require escrow payments, “very few low-income tenants appear to receive relief based 
on the implied warranty of habitability and related doctrines”).  
345 See D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study 
in a Massachusetts Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 927 (2013) (analyzing 
a study in which representation in eviction proceedings most likely reduces the probability a tenant 
ends up vacating a dwelling by between twenty-five to thirty-five percent).  
346 See Super, The Rise and Fall of the IWH, supra note 218, at 406–07 (considering how low-
income tenants know about the warranty of habitability).  
347 Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural Modernism, Post-
Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 763 (1993).    
348 See Gary Bellow & Jeanne Charn, Paths Not Taken: Some Comments on Feldman’s Critique 
of Legal Services Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 1633, 1664–65 (1995) (explaining the Eviction Free Zone 
Project in Boston).    
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time and expense needed to evict tenants.”349 What is important for this 
Article is that EFZs demonstrate the destabilizing power existing doctrines 
can have when they are employed creatively, in this case, through 
geographical targeting. EFZs attack the expectation landlords have that 
they will be able to convert their units from low- to high-rent units or to 
sell off their units as the neighborhood improves. Positively, EFZs can help 
slow or block gentrification, preventing market changes from displacing 
whole communities. But the strategy does so at some cost to ordinary 
expectations regarding the significance of property ownership.350 From the 
owners’ perspective, this targeted use of IWH allows lawyers to undercut 
owners’ rights to control and freely alienate their property.   
Housing advocates responding to the expiring use problem in public 
housing use a similar type of legal guerilla warfare. The expiring use 
problem is the result of federal programs that provided financial and tax 
incentives for the construction of rental housing in return for developers 
agreeing to house low-income tenants for an agreed upon period of time 
ranging from twenty to forty years in new or newly renovated 
complexes.351 At the end of that period, the developer’s obligations under 
the contract are met and, if the local market conditions will support it, 
those units can be turned around and rented at a much higher market 
rate.352 Of course, calling the expiring use phenomenon a “problem” is 
arguably misleading because the “problem” is built into the public/private 
agreement: the restrictions were time-limited to begin with. But that has 
not stopped housing lawyers from aggressively fighting to keep low-
income tenants in these complexes and from fighting to convince complex 
owners to agree either to extend the use restriction or to sell the properties, 
at a discount, to non-profit housing providers. Legislation designed to 
                                                                                                                          
349 Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones: The Economics of Legal Bricolage in the Fight 
Against Displacement, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 518 (1991).   
350 See Aya Gruber, Public Housing in Singapore: The Use of Ends-Based Reasoning in the Quest 
for a Workable System, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 236, 265 (1997) (“The argument is that legal service 
centers, by vigorously enforcing the warranty of habitability as an anti-eviction measure [in EFZs], are 
using immoral, or at least improper, methods to achieve the positive goal of housing the poor.”).   
351 For an excellent summary of the relevant programs as well as newer programs designed to 
keep units in the programs through additional subsidies, see EMILY P. ACHTENBERG, LOCAL 
INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., STEMMING THE TIDE: A HANDBOOK ON PRESERVING MULTIFAMILY 
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 8 (Neil Carlson & Vincent F. O’Donnell eds., 2002); see also Lawrence Geller, 
Note, Expiring Use Restrictions: Their Impact and Enforceability, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 157–67 
(1989) (explaining the background of expiring use programs); Michael Quirk, Note, Preserving 
Project-Based Housing in Massachusetts: Why the Voucher Discrimination Law Falls Short, 30 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 651, 656–67 (2011) (detailing the history of various federal affordable housing 
programs). 
352 For example, the Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation (CEDAC) 
estimates that in Massachusetts alone, over seven thousand low-income units expired during 2014 and 
over nine thousand units are at risk of expiration in 2015. CEDAC, EXPIRING USE INVENTORY REPORT 
1 (2014).  
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support non-profit or government buyouts of such housing projects 
provided additional support for this tactic by imposing additional terms on 
developers long after the original investment and construction contract was 
signed.353   
The work of public interest lawyers in both the EFZs and expiring use 
contexts involves using existing tools to actively destabilize the property 
rights of landlords and developers. Richard Thompson Ford describes such 
work as “‘informal justice’, a legal practice quite distinct from that 
imagined by traditional jurisprudence.”354 Ford explains that “[i]nformal 
justice uses legal argument as a strictly tactical device, with no regard for 
the formal purposes underlying the law.”355 Ford’s explanation, which goes 
on to highlight the distinction between traditional individual representation 
and “a larger strategy to stall gentrification,”356 is arguably a bit inaccurate 
in the case of the use of the IWH to support the community rights of low-
income tenants living in either an EFZ or a project with use restrictions set 
to expire. After all, when Judge Skelly Wright invented the IWH in Javins, 
he did so in part because of the larger social context.357 But Ford’s general 
description of the manipulative work of such a “radical lawyer” seems fair: 
“She takes the legal system and the legal culture as given and attempts to 
manipulate the outcome of cases to further her ideologically based 
goals.”358 This approach destabilizes property holdings and the 
expectations surrounding ownership using existing doctrine, without 
inventing new categories or forms of property.   
An understandable response to the above discussion of EFZs and the 
expiring use problem is to see these examples as dated, and perhaps 
irrelevant, to property law today. But several of the borrower-side 
responses to the foreclosure crisis show the continued reach of informal 
justice. The Great Recession began with property, with problems in the 
housing market tied to the bursting of the housing bubble,359 yet 
                                                                                                                          
353 See Geller, supra note 351, at 167 (describing the Emergency Low Income Housing 
Preservation Act of 1987, which prohibited developers from exercising their prepayment rights in order 
to get out of the use restrictions); William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development 
Movement, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 377, 396 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 4110(b) and describing a requirement that 
developers give non-profits, government entities, and residents an exclusive right to bid for an initial 
period before the project is fully put into the market).   
354 Richard Thompson Ford, Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Personhood, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
217, 238 (1995) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993)).  
355 Id.  
356 Id. at 238–39.  
357 See Letter from J. Skelly Wright to Professor Edward H. Rabin (Oct. 14, 1982), reprinted in 
Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 517, 549 (1984) (discussing the social and economic dynamics that influenced 
landlord-tenant law). 
358 Ford, supra note 354, at 239.   
359 See Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1607, 1610 (2010) (noting that the current economic crisis is grounded in property).   
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government efforts initially focused on “shoring up the banking system 
even if this means subsidizing the very institutions that caused the financial 
crisis in the first place.”360 Bank bailouts protected lenders from losses 
associated with bad mortgages, risks of which were held in a variety of 
forms including securitized debt obligations and credit default swaps. In 
contrast, little federal support reached individual borrowers.361 As Nobel 
laureate Joseph Stiglitz observed, “the bailout strategy put the interests of 
the banks (and especially the large banks) and bankers ahead of the rest of 
our economy.”362 Lacking a similar government bailout to individuals, 
borrowers and their attorneys had to come up with creative ways of 
blocking or slowing down the foreclosure machine. 
One set of proposals sought to impose new terms on lenders, 
essentially trying to cram down the mortgages, forcing lenders to accept 
rewritten contracts at a fraction of their face value or with additional rights 
for borrowers.363 Although the idea of rewriting mortgages received 
considerable attention, ultimately it went nowhere.364 Anti-borrower 
sentiment (“why should irresponsible borrowers be let off the hook”)365 
                                                                                                                          
360 Singer, supra note 183, at 81.   
361 See Gupta, supra note 26, at 549–53 (noting the unsuccessful attempts of the federal 
government to address the housing crisis); Dan Immergluck, Too Little, Too Late, and Too Timid: The 
Federal Response to the Foreclosure Crisis at the Five-Year Mark, 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 199 
passim (2013) (discussing the inadequate federal response to the foreclosure crisis).   
362 STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 245.  
363 Robert Hockett advocates, over a number of articles, the use of eminent domain as the solution 
to the problem of underwater mortgages. See Robert Hockett & John Vlahoplus, A Federalist Blessing 
in Disguise: From National Inaction to Local Action on Underwater Mortgages, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 253, 266–69 (2013) (stating that cities and states can easily use their eminent domain authority to 
ultimately modify loans and thus make them payable); Robert Hockett, Accidental Suicide Pacts and 
Creditor Collective Action Problems: The Mortgage Mess, the Deadweight Loss, and How to Get the 
Value Back, 98 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 55, 66–71 (2013) (advocating that state and municipal 
governments comprise the collective agent best equipped to address collective action problems 
preventing principal write-downs); Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation 
Proceedings and Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, 
and Local Economic Recovery, 18 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 149–67 (2012) (detailing the Municipal 
Plan, which is designed to “sidestep all of the unnecessary impediments that presently block 
meaningful debt revaluation and attendant value maximization”). Other proposals include expanding 
homeowner bankruptcy rights in foreclosure against mortgage holders. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Home 
Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2261, 2265 (2008) (considering “mortgage delinquency management tools through the lens of 
purported ends of housing policy, including whether they honor and further the goals of wealth 
building, positive social-psychological states, and community development”). 
364 See, e.g., Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 748 F.3d 28, 30–31 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(discussing the issue of rewriting mortgages). But see Robert Hockett, “We Don’t Follow, We Lead”: 
How New York City Will Save Mortgage Loans by Condemning Them, 124 YALE L.J. F. 131, 131–34 
(2014) (suggesting that eminent domain proposals may still be attempted). 
365 See Gupta, supra note 26, at 54447 (noting that blame has often been placed on 
homeowners); Joseph William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime 
Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 510, 537 (2013) (discussing 
social perceptions of risky borrower behavior). 
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and the lobbying power of the banks366 staved off legislative change, and 
courts were generally reluctant to undo or alter valid contracts simply to 
aid one party (the borrower) to the contract.367 After an initial burst of 
legislative changes, the imposed solution turned out to be largely a dead 
end.368 But the informal justice approach—using the law as a means to an 
end regardless of the purpose of the original rule—has found some 
success.369 Waves of foreclosures hit the housing market just prior to and 
throughout the Great Recession, yet by drawing on formal law regarding 
the foreclosure process, lawyers on the borrower side managed to dampen 
the force of some of these waves.370 Recording and filing requirements—
long neglected by banks, courts, and lawyers—were deployed and 
succeeded in slowing down the foreclosure machine.371 The very liquidity 
of commercial paper—largely in the form of the bundled mortgages that 
helped drive up the housing market and led to the crisis372—created a 
situation in which, for example, mortgage holders could not produce 
original loan documents. Lawyers and their clients “started questioning 
whether the bank bringing foreclosure action was entitled to recover the 
property.”373 The scale of the problem in the mortgage markets led banks 
and their lawyers to try to use shortcuts, such as, most famously, 
robosigning documents.374 Borrower-side lawyers rightly attacked such 
practices.375 As Nestor Davidson highlighted, the end result was a 
                                                                                                                          
366 See Tracie R. Porter, Pawns for a Higher Greed: The Banking and Financial Services 
Industry’s Capture of Federal Homeownership Policy and the Impact on Citizen Homeowners, 37 
HAMLINE L. REV. 139, 163–66, 176–79 (2014) (discussing banking, financial services and insurance 
companies’ success in lobbying the government for favorable regulations). 
367 See Shoked, supra note 3, at 460–61 n.133 (collecting cases in which banks successfully 
defeated challenges to lending practices in urban areas).   
368 See Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the Yawning Abyss of the Deep 
Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 455, 458–59, 483–87, 491–501 (2012) (stating 
that various government reform efforts have failed). 
369 See id. at 481–83, 494–95 (discussing the courts’ more stringent approach to foreclosure laws); 
Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of the Robo-Sign Scandal, 64 
ME. L. REV. 17, 34–38 (2011) (discussing the broad and remedial nature of Unfair and Deceptive Acts 
and Practices laws). 
370 For a list of possible legal strategies to resist foreclosure and an argument that state courts 
should be more receptive to these moves, see Andrew J. Kazakes, Protecting Absent Stakeholders in 
Foreclosure Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and State Court Responses, 43 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1383, 1396–99 (2010). 
371 See Kochan, supra note 264, at 283–97 (presenting ways banks ignored or tried to get around 
formal recording requirements).   
372 For an explanation of what lay behind the glut of mortgage finance, see Adam J. Levitin & 
Susan W. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1181 (2013). 
373 Singer, supra note 365, at 518. 
374 See Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 867, 869–70 (2013) (discussing 
the lawyers involved in the expedited foreclosure processes associated with the robo-signing scandals). 
375 See Gregg H. Mosson, Robosigning Foreclosures: How It Violates Law, Must Be Stopped, and 
Why Mortgage Law Reform Is Needed to Ensure the Certainty and Values of Real Property, 40 W. ST. 
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resurgence of formalism among progressive public interest lawyers.376 A 
borrower-side strategy of pushing for strict enforcement of process 
requirements found support in a series of cases brought by state Attorneys 
General that alleged that banks had engaged in discriminatory and 
deceptive lending practices.377 Together they undermined the concentrated 
property interests of banks, destabilizing their holdings as well as their 
expectation that the law would favor them over defaulting borrowers. 
Though the title “homeowner” is usually given to borrowers immediately 
following purchase, regardless of how much is owed to the lending 
institution, in practice, the defense of these borrower-homeowners amounts 
to a claim-based attempt to secure homeowner communities that is fairly 
analogous to how eviction defense can secure tenant communities.      
These are property-centric examples of the larger lesson that jaded 
students and professors sometimes forget: lawyers matter. They show that 
legal assistance for vulnerable people and communities can disrupt normal 
expectations regarding ownership and power. The lesson is not one that has 
gone unheeded by defenders of the status quo. As David Luban showed in 
his essay, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public 
Interest Lawyers, the very success of attorneys advocating for the poor 
inspired a reactionary response designed to squeeze out and “muzzle” 
public interest lawyers and their clients.378 It is only because legal aid 
attorneys are effective that Governor Ronald Reagan demonized them, 
President Reagan gutted their funding, and Congress in 1996 handcuffed 
legal aid offices with arguably unethical restrictions on how they can 
practice law.379 Even with these restrictions, there is still space for lawyers 
for the poor to make a difference. Providing access to legal assistance itself 
makes a difference, but, as Gary Smith argues, advocates for poor 
communities can, and perhaps should, reclaim some of the transformative 
ambitions of the early mission of legal services during the War on 
Poverty.380 Or, to frame this in terms of the argument in this Article, 
                                                                                                                          
U. L. REV. 31, 70 (2012) (highlighting the role plaintiff-side lawyers played in “bringing robosigning to 
light”).   
376 See Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 389, 394–96 (2013) (explaining that the emerging mortgage jurisprudence ironically underscores 
pluralist conceptions of property). 
377 See Brescia, supra note 369, at 30–34 (2011) (summarizing the cases and resulting 
settlements). 
378 David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 
91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 245 (2003). 
379 See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 14–16, 29–34, 36–37 (2007) (discussing 
government frustration of legal aid services goals).  
380 See Gary F. Smith, Poverty Warriors: A Historical Perspective on the Mission of Legal 
Services, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 34 passim (2011) (stating that advocates may revisit the original 
mission of the first legal services program). 
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creatively using existing law to destabilize the ordinary working of 
property is another way lawyers matter, even if doing so involves working 
against property.   
B. Pragmatic Resistance 
Sometimes more is needed. Property law and the economic 
stratification of our society are both remarkably resilient and resistant to 
meaningful change. The current period of our history is a good illustration 
of these complementary—and mutually reinforcing—features of the law, 
of economics, and of their interaction. Since roughly the oil shocks of the 
1970s, productivity gains and the incomes of most workers have 
diverged.381 After World War II, the United States enjoyed a period of 
phenomenal and broadly shared economic growth. But since the 1970s the 
wealthiest one (and especially 0.1) percent of Americans have captured 
most of the rewards of productivity gains, which have continued to rise 
much as they did before the 1970s.382 In contrast, working-class Americans 
have barely seen their incomes rise. Where households have gotten ahead it 
has been the result not of income gains but of switching from a single wage 
earner to the expectation that all adults, regardless of parental obligations, 
participate in the wage economy.383 The Great Recession put an 
exclamation point on the problems of the New Gilded Age. Young people, 
even relatively privileged college graduates, including law school 
graduates, face a difficult job market marked by unemployment and 
underemployment.384 Moreover, they can expect a prolonged period of 
lower earnings as a consequence of the state of the economy when they are 
entering the workforce.385 It is no wonder that they are delaying what had 
                                                                                                                          
381 See, e.g., Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13106, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w13106.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4VB-EM9C] (stating that it is “problematic that recent productivity 
gains have not significantly raised incomes for most American workers”). 
382 See Lawrence Mishel et al., Wage Inequality: A Story of Policy Choices, NEW LABOR F., Aug. 
4, 2014, at 4–5 (“Much of the increase in equality has taken place in the top 1 percent.”); see also Josh 
Bivens et al., Raising America’s Pay: Why It’s Our Central Economic Policy Challenge, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. (June 4, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/raising-americas-pay/ [http://perma.cc/4XV4-
Z83M] (emphasizing the urgency of addressing unequal wage growth in the United States). Perhaps the 
best resource on understanding income inequality over the last several decades is the State of Working 
America website, http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/, and the associated report which was last 
published in print form in 2012 and is now presented through interactive charts. See generally 
LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 53–138 (12th ed. 2012) (addressing the 
centrality of income inequality for American families and households). 
383 See generally ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: 
WHY MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING BROKE 97–122 (2003). 
384 See STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 265 (illustrating the economic challenges for twenty-year-
olds).  
385 See Lisa B. Kahn, The Long-Term Labor Market Consequences of Graduating from College in 
a Bad Economy, 17 LABOUR ECON. 303 (2010); Philip Oreopoulos et al., The Short- and Long-Term 
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been typical life stages such as moving out of their parents’ houses,386 
marrying,387 having kids, and purchasing a first home.388 It is not just the 
young whose prospects are bleak. Many seniors have been unable to find 
new jobs following layoffs at the start of the recession.389 Some sectors in 
the economy are doing well, but the strength of others, such as retailers of 
luxury goods and high-end car companies, speaks volumes about the rise 
of inequality in the country.   
The problem of inequality is not necessarily new nor news, but the 
Great Recession has been instrumental in bringing attention to these issues. 
As early as 2008, Julie Nice observed, “[a]t this particular moment in 
American history, poverty is making a rare appearance as an urgent 
concern on the political radar screen.”390 The Occupy movement, which 
began in September 2011, brought the idea of the 1% into the popular and 
political lexicon and helped spur a national dialogue about poverty and 
inequality.391 In 2014, a 700-page work by a French economist, Thomas 
Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century,392 attacking the inequality of 
                                                                                                                          
Career Effects of Graduating in a Recession: Hysteresis and Heterogeneity in the Market for College 
Graduates 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12159, 2006), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12159.pdf [http://perma.cc/W49W-3GCQ] (“Graduating during a 
recession leads to significantly lower earnings at the beginning of an individual’s labor market . . . .”). 
386 See, e.g., RAKESH KOCHHAR & D’VERA COHN, FIGHTING POVERTY IN A TOUGH ECONOMY, 
AMERICANS MOVE IN WITH RELATIVES 1 passim (2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011 
/10/Multigenerational-Households-Final1.pdf [http://perma.cc/QRZ6-WXBV] (acknowledging the 
popular choice of Americans to live with relatives); Adam Davidson, It’s Official: The Boomerang 
Kids Won’t Leave, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/magazine/ 
its-official-the-boomerang-kids-wont-leave.html?_r=0 (discussing the prevalence of young adults 
living with their parents). 
387 Poverty and inequality are not only changing when people marry, but they are also making 
marriage’s meaning and experience differ across classes. See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, 
MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); KATHRYN 
EDIN & MARIA J. KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE 
MARRIAGE 111 (2011) (illustrating that while women may still be interested in marriage, many are 
putting it off in favor of economic stability and other factors). 
388 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 2014, at 12–16 (2014) (discussing how the difficult economy has contributed to young adults’ 
reluctance to purchase homes).  
389 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-445, UNEMPLOYED OLDER 
WORKERS: MANY EXPERIENCE CHALLENGES REGAINING EMPLOYMENT AND FACE REDUCED 
RETIREMENT SECURITY (2012) (discussing the employment challenges faced by older workers). 
390 Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of 
Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 664 (2008).     
391 See Sarah Leberstein & Anastasia Christman, Occupy Our Occupations: Why “We Are the 
99%” Resonates with Working People and What We Can Do to Fix the American Workplace, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1073, 1073–75 (2012) (“The experts have named ‘Occupy’ 2011’s word of the 
year.” ).   
392 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013).  
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modern capitalism, became a best seller.393 Yet in many respects very little 
has changed, despite both forty years of relative wage stagnation for the 
median worker and the increased attention that issues of poverty and 
inequality have received since the start of the Great Recession. Proposals 
to change the law have largely gone nowhere. On the finance side, tax 
incentives continue to flow to hedge fund managers, “too big to fail” 
institutions remain too big to fail, wrongdoing has been largely swept 
under the rug through settlements instead of criminal punishment,394 and, 
perhaps most troubling, stock market returns seem to no longer be tied to 
what is happening on Main Street. Property law has remained equally 
resistant and resilient to change in the face of economic challenges. In 
2010, Nestor Davidson and Rashmi Dyal-Chand observed that the 
economic crisis “made basic questions about the nature of property a daily 
aspect of our cultural and political dialogue.”395 They continued, “[i]t is too 
early to draw definitive conclusions about the residue that this crisis will 
leave on property doctrine.”396 Five years later, definitive conclusions 
perhaps are still difficult, but it appears as if, at most, only minor residue 
will be left. The crisis, and the opportunity to make significant changes, 
seems to have been wasted after all.397 Or perhaps more accurately, 
property law once again showed its resilience.   
While the last sub-Part showed that property law can be a destabilizing 
tool, this sub-Part looks at a more radical alternative—destabilizing 
property through confrontation and resistance. Given the state’s role in 
protecting private property, challenges to how property is held often must 
approach or even cross criminal lines for destabilization to occur. But 
without confrontation, those with privilege may choose to ignore those 
who are excluded from the benefits of property or may not see the benefits 
of changing the role property plays in society.398 My argument is heavily 
indebted to the pioneering work of Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal, 
whose book, Property Outlaws, showed how rule violators can improve 
property law.399 Using an expansive range of examples, Peñalver and 
Katyal argue that property law is and can be improved by paying attention 
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to a wide range of “outlaw” behavior, from the lunch counter sit-ins of the 
civil rights movement to the widespread copyright infringement of illegal 
music downloading.400 When they are frequent or are tied to a valid moral 
claim, violations of the law may reflect a need to revisit the law. Having 
shown the value of such outlaw behavior, Peñalver and Katyal conclude by 
arguing that property protections and enforcement mechanisms should not 
become so effective that they foreclose all space to violate or challenge the 
law.401 Though they do not frame their argument in the same way, Peñalver 
and Katyal’s masterful work and the examples they collected are in line 
with the idea that the law must be periodically destabilized and open to 
such challenges. My point of departure from Peñalver and Katyal is that I 
see more radical potential of rule breaking to destabilize property holdings 
and protections than envisioned by their more reasonable approach.   
One of the most damaging myths regarding low-income people and 
communities is that they are powerless to resist oppressive structures. In 
fact resistance and rule violations occur all the time, in subtle and not-so-
subtle ways. In his description of the all-encompassing nature of the law as 
it relates to and controls the lives of poor people, Austin Sarat explained 
that “being on welfare means having a significant part of one’s life 
organized by a regime of legal rules invoked by officials to claim 
jurisdiction over choices and decisions which those not on welfare would 
regard as personal and private.”402 But even with the law playing such a 
large role in their lives, Sarat went on to note that “[r]esistance exists side-
by-side with power and domination.”403 These two linked observations are 
found throughout the literature on the lives of the poor. Examples of 
people resisting structural oppression, including oppression done under the 
color of property law, are found throughout history. Indeed, there has been 
a major effort by contemporary scholars to unearth these resistance stories.  
And while the goal of such resistance sometimes is to incorporate the 
concerns of the subordinated into the law, it is often to fight against or 
overthrow the oppressive system completely. As rights scholars have 
pointed out in the civil rights and social movement areas, channeling such 
resistance through the law—here, working with property law—may 
wrongly blunt demands for change and alter the nature of the demands. But 
what would resistance, working against property law, look like and what 
could it accomplish? Though one can imagine many answers to these 
questions, from, at one extreme, the idea that destabilization would 
accomplish very little to, at the opposite extreme, that it would lead to 
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anarchy, I suggest a more optimistic view of deliberate efforts to 
destabilize property protections. In this sub-Part I argue that working 
against property law may be the best way to mobilize Americans and to 
force a national debate about the role property law plays in maintaining the 
status quo. Resistance can be a tool to generate a political response—
something a work-with-property approach may not be able to accomplish.   
Progressives have long argued that the national “ideology” of what is 
required for success, which focuses on individual hard work, is not 
accurate.404 Arguably, the country is reaching a tipping point when it 
comes to rejecting the Horatio Alger myth in favor of broad-based 
recognition of the importance of class and inequality.405 Confrontation and 
resistance to existing power structures such as the exclusionary power of 
property may be the best tools to provide the final necessary push. Issues 
of inequality and opportunity are pressing enough across the ideological 
spectrum that two large conservative think tanks, the American Enterprise 
Institute and the Heritage Foundation, joined in an unlikely partnership 
with two more progressive think tanks, the Brookings Institute and the 
Urban Institute, to form the Economic Mobility Project.406 The project’s 
reports, as well as the work of other scholars working on economic 
mobility, make for sobering reading. Among their findings, “Americans 
raised at the bottom and top of the family income ladder are likely to 
remain there as adults, a phenomenon known as ‘stickiness at the ends.’”407 
The same report notes “[b]lacks are more likely to be stuck in the bottom 
and more likely to fall from the middle of the family income and wealth 
ladders than are whites.”408 After introducing the American idea that hard 
work leads to economic success, another report notes “[the] rags-to-riches 
story is more prevalent in Hollywood than in reality. In fact, 43 percent of 
Americans raised at the bottom of the income ladder remain stuck there as 
adults, and 70 percent never even make it to the middle.”409 To get a good 
overall understanding of economic mobility in the United States, it is worth 
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quoting Jared Bernstein at length: 
These two concepts—intra- and intergenerational mobility—
both shed light on the fluidity, or lack thereof, of class in 
America. The evidence presented here shows some degree of 
mobility: families do change [relative positions], and the 
correlation between parents and children is far from one. Yet 
two important points emerge. First, there is not as much 
mobility as American mythology might lead one to expect. 
Most families end up at or near the same relative income 
position in which they start, and, as noted, when it comes to 
parent/children income correlations, the apple does not fall 
very far from the tree. Second, the rate of mobility has not 
increased and may have fallen. The United States is a more 
unequal society, yet Americans have not become more 
mobile.410 
This is a damning conclusion, but the idea of American mobility has 
one final line of defense. Even if we accept that the United States is not 
perfect, if the economic structure is more permeable than other 
alternatives, it can be celebrated. Unfortunately, this is not the case: “the 
relationship between parental socioeconomic advantage and child 
outcomes is the strongest” in the United States compared to similar 
developed countries.411 As the American Enterprise Institute recently 
noted, economic mobility in the United States is significantly lower than in 
other countries.412   
The mismatch between the country’s fairly rigid class/caste structure 
and public perceptions regarding economic opportunity creates the 
potential for resistance strategies to resonate politically. It is hard 
prospectively to say what sort of challenges to property protections will 
arise and which will be successful. But past examples of resistance that 
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succeeded in destabilizing property demonstrate that challenges to 
accepted property right protections can be transformative. The most well-
known examples of such resistance are perhaps the Civil Rights, Women’s 
Rights, and, more recently, Gay Rights movements. In each of these cases, 
the claims were and are deeply unsettling to many established 
expectations, including exclusionary property-based expectations. The 
central claim of these movements—that all men and women are equal 
regardless of skin color or sexual orientation—is seen as so self-evidently 
true that it is easy to lose sight of the profoundly disruptive nature of both 
these movements and their claims.413 All three of these movements 
challenged the existing power structure, prying open things like public 
accommodations, public and private benefits, and rights to hold property. 
They did so in the face of counterarguments that tradition, private rights of 
association, and long-standing state preferences should not be undermined. 
One can see their successes in two ways. First, as the natural result of the 
country’s founding principles, a point that Martin Luther King, Jr. drove 
home in his I Have a Dream speech. King drew upon the Declaration of 
Independence, expressing his hope that “this nation will rise up, [and] live 
out the true meaning of its creed: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal.’”414 Second, the successes show the 
importance of mobilization. African-Americans did not just ask the nation 
to “cash a check,” as King put it; they demanded it in demonstrations 
across the country.415 Resistance took many forms—yes, bus boycotts and 
marches, but also sit-ins and voter registration drives—and while King’s 
non-violent approach is rightly celebrated, it was not the only form of 
resistance in the movement.416 Furthermore, non-violence is not the same 
as law-abiding, as is powerfully attested to by King’s many arrests and his 
Letter from a Birmingham Jail.417 An honest assessment would 
acknowledge that successes that have occurred—not only for the civil 
rights movement but also for the women’s and gay rights movements—
were a result of the coming together of both of these strategies. 
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Mobilization and resistance forced changes in part by taking advantage of 
the space provided by societal structures such as the popular understanding 
of the nature of the country. Successful resistance campaigns will have to 
find similar sweet spots to challenge the systematic exclusionary effects of 
property.   
I want to suggest that one possible strategy for destabilizing property is 
focusing mobilization on exposing the contrast between the protection of 
the property interests of the wealthy compared to the lack of protection 
provided to low-income people and communities. Such a demand by the 
subordinated is relatively straightforward; your property rights do not 
deserve protection if my rights are not going to be protected. What is 
destabilizing about this demand is that it inverts the ordinary political 
demand that property rights enjoyed by others be extended. Progressive 
property is an example of an ordinary political demand in that it advocates 
for the excluded, for non-owners, and for community or social interests, 
but it does so without showing how the politics around property are to 
change. The destabilization claim is more radical (or more “realist”418) but 
it can be seen in numerous recent protest movements. Though the Occupy 
movement spread, it began by claiming space in the financial heart of 
America. Union workers who picket or engage in sit-down strikes aim to 
block customer and employer access to the very facilities that are being 
protested. The housing affordability advocates in San Francisco who 
blocked “Google Buses” did so to target the people who are seen as pricing 
them out of the city.419 And when the tenants of entire buildings band 
together, refusing to pay a rent increase, their financial vulnerability 
suddenly becomes felt in a personal and financial way by the property 
owner. The point of these examples of “property disobedience”420 is not to 
suggest that any one of these strategies is the best route forward but to 
show that resistance can create political possibilities that might not exist 
absent confrontation. Resistance can take many forms, including 
threatened actions or protests: credible threats may serve a politically 
galvanizing role similar to more active destabilization efforts.   
Destabilization involves lessening the inequities involved in respecting 
property rights. As the legal realists understood, to say someone has a 
property right to something is to say that he or she has a right to that thing 
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and that others are obligated to respect that right.421 But where economic 
mobility is such that the lottery of birth plays a largely determinative role 
in peoples’ access to property throughout their lifetimes, asking that the 
property rights of others be respected is asking a lot. Selectively not 
respecting, or threatening not to respect, all property rights may force 
owners to recognize the extent to which their claims rely upon the social 
contract. Where that contract is broken—as, I would argue, it is when 
people are denied meaningful and equal access to property—it may be 
appropriate to lessen or even imperil property rights. And it is in 
destabilization’s ability to force recognition that the protection of property 
rights is premised on some degree of fairness that destabilization offers 
something not offered by approaches that work for or with property. 
Working against property may sound radical, but the alternative, leaving in 
place an inequitable system and locking in place inequality through strict 
forms of property protection and adherence to property law, is surely just 
as radical.422  
V.  CONCLUSION 
My hope in writing this Article is not to disparage existing property 
scholarship. Despite the critiques of progressive property contained in this 
Article, I am largely in agreement with the progressive property agenda 
and agree with the scholars writing from that perspective. Similarly, 
although it is no doubt clear that I would not classify myself as 
conservative, I find the work of information theorists enlightening and 
largely agree with their descriptive characterizations of property law. But 
until we recognize the extent to which status quo bias informs our views on 
both the structure of the law and how well the law works, we will continue 
to tinker, looking for ways to work with property law rather than 
recognizing the need for more radical change. The hope is that challenging 
the status quo will “release[] the mental grip of conventional structures on 
the capacity to consider alternatives.”423 Although there are libertarian 
gripes about our system and occasional spikes in public concern about the 
security of property rights,424 property ownership in general is quite secure 
and owners rightly have little concern that their property rights will be 
diminished in any significant way. Perhaps in the interests of those 
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excluded it is time to selectively destabilize property. 
 
 
 
